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THE ACTIVITY OF ECONOMIC LIFE

BY PROFESSOR GUSTAV CASSEL

Recent monetary theory has given a prominent place to a distinction between *"saving"* and *"investment"* and to a conception of investment as a mere part of total saving. It even seems to be quite a common view that this distinction marks an essential progress of the whole theory of social economy. This may on good grounds be questioned.

First of all such a distinction is apt to make the public believe that some saving would be left uninvested and be doomed to lead a mysterious existence out in the blue, rather like a disembodied spirit. It is the first duty of scientific theory to fight against such loose and dim notions.

Serious objections also arise to ranking "investment" as an independent economic concept. Investment is in its nature not a quantity, which it obviously must be if it is to be put on a level with saving and even be capable of being subtracted from it. As I have shown in the April number of this Report, income which has not been consumed, nor been used for repayment of debts to the banks, is always invested in the sense that it has a concrete existence in real capital or in claims or other rights. If the new theory desires to limit the concept of investment by connecting it with some particular act on the part of the saver, that is to say, if "investment" is interpreted to mean a choice of particular securities, it must firstly be observed that the great majority of savers never make such a choice themselves but leave that to the banks or to savings institutions of various kinds. The funds entrusted to such institutions certainly cannot be regarded as "uninvested". But even if the saver himself decides upon a particular investment this does not necessarily mean that his act has any corresponding reality in social economy. If a saver buys bonds it may be another saver who sells them, and it is by no means certain that the purchase leads to an increase in the total quantity of circulating bonds. Even if this should be so, the companies that have issued the new bonds may use the money for repayment of debts, for instance to the banks. Thus, if we want to give any social-economic reality to the concept of investment as a quantity we are forced to identify it with an increase in the community's stock of real capital. This concept, hovewer, already inevitably enters into even the most elementary economic theory. There is no need to introduce a new name for this basic concept.

Those who would interpret investment as an act on the part of the saver conducing to a more *active* co-operation of his savings in the process of production must realize that this greater activity is a very relative concept. If, for example, savings are invested in stocks of materials, these stocks may flow through the process of production with greater or less speed, and thus the investment of the saver may be more or less active from the point of view of the social economy. The same applies to savings invested in fixed real capital, for instance in machinery. Machines may be used more or less fully and intensively. In all such cases, however, there is a question of a difference in *degree,* and this difference cannot possibly justify a distinction between "invested" and "non-invested" funds as being two different categories.

Nor is it the *saver* who determines the degree of activity which his saving shall receive. This is the function of the *entrepreneur,* and should the saver actually exert such an influence by a definite choice of investment he turns himself *eo ipso* into an entrepreneur.

A period of depression is characterized by

reduced activity in the process of production. The fixed real capital is only partially used and floating real capital runs through the process of production more slowly than normally. At the same time a certain degree of unemployment prevails. Thus the capacity of production surpasses the actual production. The problem is then to give increased activity to the whole process of production, so that all factors of production may be used as completely as possible. It is of great practical importance to realize that this is the aim of all endeavours to overcome the depression. For economic theory it is equally important to realize that the remedy is to give greater activity to investments, not to invest funds that have been left "uninvested".

When a part of the savings is used for repayment of debts to the banks with a corresponding reduction of the supply of bank means of payment it may be said that total savings are greater than total investments. But this phrase only means that the banks fail to compensate the annihilation of means of payment by a corresponding issue of new means of payment. This is an occurrence of a monetary nature — in fact, is a process of deflation — and should be treated as such.

If people believe that the depression essentially results from a surplus of saving above investment, they will readily conclude that the depression ought to be combatted by a reduction of saving, that is to say, by more liberal spending. Lately this has also been recommended, in a somewhat sensational way, as a cure for the depression. Once it has been made clear that a depression can only be conquered by increasing the activity of economic life, this question will stand out in a new light. Of course it may be said even then that increased consumption would itself result in higher activity. It is, however, by no means sure that a reduction of saving would be the right remedy. During the depression it is no doubt usual for production generally to slow down. Its two main branches, the production of consumers' goods and the production of capital goods, are however, as a rule, affected by this reduction in a very different degree. The caracteristic feature of the depression is precisely that capital production shows a much more marked decrease than the production of consumers' goods. Our endeavours must therefore be directed principally towards increasing the production of capital goods. This is only possible however if savings are forthcoming in sufficient volume.

A continued saving must gradually relieve the capital market and bring down the rates of interest. If such a development is allowed to proceed in a natural way it gives to capital production a stimulus that usually proves sufficient for such an increase in this production as will put an end to the whole depression. This is, as we know, the way in which a turn of the business cycle is normally brought about.

The opinion that further saving would be unnecessary during the depression is supported by the belief that the community has been supplied with too much real capital during the previous boom. The underestimation of saving is strengthened during the period of depression when everybody can see how inadequately the real capital is used. However, the ideas about a superfluity of real capital are mostly rather exaggerated. Statistical figures showing the low degree of utilization of real capital must be read with great caution. The real capacity of production is usually far from being so great as the figures indicate. In fact, a considerable part of the real capital is adulterated and does not come up to the latest standards of effectivity. For this reason incessant work for the renewal of the real capital is going on even during the depression with the result that its effectivity is being continuously increased. The American steel industry, in spite of a very low degree of employment, continues to invest tremendous sums in modernizing its equipment. In spite of an enormous volume of tonnage being laid up throughout the world the building of new ships with higher efficiency is continuously going on. Such an improvement in the community's stock of real capital has always been an essential factor in superseding the depression.

This is doubtless also the case under the

present depression. If we should once succeed in eliminating the disturbances which are its cause we should certainly find that our equipment of means of production is in many respects entirely unsatisfactory.

Moreover, the house accommodation of the community is always insufficient. For the satisfaction of this want, as well as for a better utilization of the means of production in general and thus for the purpose of ending the depression, it is of essential importance that building activities should increase. To this end, however, an incessant supply of new savings is required. Indeed, in the present situation the most hopeful sign of recovery is the stimulus given to building by the low rates of interest.

Thus we find that a continuous saving is an indispensable condition for economic activity. It must be wrong therefore to try to conquer the depression by any endeavours to check saving or to disparage its social-economic value.

So long as private enterprise is insufficient for the necessary increase in economic activity a reduction of unemployment by the aid of public works seems to be a natural way out. This enables a more complete use of the productive powers available, and what is thus produced is obtained, from the point of view of the social economy, without sacrificing any other satisfaction of wants. This fact induces people to accept public works as a means for overcoming the crisis, even if they are otherwise alien to a belief in any form of socialism as being something desirable in itself.

Against the increased activity in economic life that may be attained by the aid of public works we must however put the further crippling of private enterprise that may ensue if the government (or local bodies) enter on business activity. Private enterprise may find itself placed at a disadvantage by enterprise undertaken or subsidized by the government. Such for instance may easily be the result of utilizing public money for the construction of houses or for subsidizing such construction. Similarly, private enterprise may see itself threatened if the government intervenes in order to help private business involved in difficulties and thereby deranges the natural conditions for competition in efficiency. Further, state enterprise may have the consequence that certain wages are maintained on an uneconomic level, that is to say a level incompatible with equilibrium in the social economy. Such action may obviously delay that restoration of equilibrium which is indispensable for overcoming the crisis. Finally it must be observed that the provision of funds for public works must burden either the capital market or the tax payers. This burden may become so oppressive that it acts as a serious check upon the development of private enterprise.

If we wish to draw up a correct balance sheet of the different results of public works for combatting unemployment these minus items must be booked against the plus items, and the balance struck. It is by no means unlikely that this balance will be negative. In the case of the United States in particular the experience hitherto accumulated seems to point in such a direction. In no case is it possible to look upon public works as any lasting solution of the task before us. At any rate not so long as this task is understood to be to attain such an increase in the activity of *private* business as will restore to our productive forces reasonably complete employment.

A curtailment of saving and an extension of public works are the main points in the policy of expansion that has attracted the chief attention in different countries during the present crisis. In both these points, however, the expansion policy is determined by a false or at any rate an incomplete comprehension of the conditions that must be fulfilled if economic progress is to be based on private enterprise. It is obviously impossible definitely to cure the crisis by measures that relieve symptoms, but which in a deeper sense are contradictory to the said conditions. The depression is in its essence an abnormal reduction in the activity of private economic life, and it can only be definitely overcome by a removal of the factors that have caused the paralysis.

Among these factors the most important one is no doubt the general fall in prices. We have

to do here with a process of deflation, that is to say with a phenomenon that is of a purely *monetary* nature and which can therefore be combatted only with monetary measures. The acknowledgement of this truth does not prevent a further analysis of the crisis with a view to clearing up the different disturbances of *other* kinds that may co-operate in bringing about an abnormal reduction in the activity of economic life.

Among these disturbances we must reckon a failing equilibrium between different groups of prices, for instance between wages in sheltered industries, such as the building trade, and wages in those industries that have to face international competition, particularly wages in agriculture. In the present depression political disturbances also play an essential part. Such disturbances were behind the collapse of the world's monetary system in 1931, which since then has been the dominant factor in the present crisis. Political disturbances are still making themselves felt in the form of a vague fear of war. A more permanent political factor of disturbance is however the incessant interference of governments in economic life, and specially that sort of such interference which manifests itself in the destruction of international trade. It is the extraordinary insecurity in the conditions which governments nowadays offer to private economic activity that more than anything else ruins confidence and puts the brake on enterprise.

In spite of all the difficulties that have been placed in its way, private enterprise has shown such toughness and vitality that it does not seem unreasonable to assume that it would quickly restore our economic life to full activity, were it only to recover a reliable monetary basis and something like normal liberty of action. In any case such a heightening of the activity of the social economy seems to be the only solution of the problem of the world's crisis that is compatible with a right analysis of the causes of the crisis as well as of the normal way of functioning of our present social economy.

SWEDEN'S EXPORTS VIEWED IN A HISTORICAL SETTING

BY PROFESSOR ARTHUR MONTGOMERY

If in the eighteenth century some one had asked which was the most important of the Swedish export industries, there need not have been a moment's hesitation about the answer. The manufacture of iron then held such a dominant position that it almost eclipsed other branches of production for export. The quota contributed by iron to the total exports seems to have been maintained at about 60 per cent., and at times apparently rose still higher, up to 75 per cent. Measured by modern standards, the amount of iron then exported was not very large: about the middle of the century the figure was approximately 40,000 tons per annum. This amount, however, was of very great importance on the then world market. According to an estimate made by Professor Heckscher, Sweden's share in the world production of malleable iron ("bar iron") in the middle of the century was about 30 per cent., possibly somewhat more. Apart from the supply of good ores and water power, which, of course, were fundamental essentials, a factor of paramount importance in establishing Sweden's dominant position on the world market was the abundance of timber. So long as fossil fuel could not be used for the manufacture of iron, those countries which, like England, were destitute of timber were in a very unfavourable position, and they were greatly dependent on imports, mainly from Sweden and Russia. During the early part of the eighteenth century Sweden appears to have supplied up to 40 per cent. of England's consumption of bar iron.

So important in fact was the production of charcoal for the requirements of the domestic manufacture of iron, that it was this that imparted to the large supplies of Swedish timber their chief value from the point of view of exports. On the other hand, the actual production of sawn goods was, relatively speaking, poorly developed. Compared with iron, timber was a product of low value; and not till produced on a much larger scale could timber products assume any considerable importance in the country's exports. But in the eighteenth century there was as yet no basis for such an expansion. In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, the situation began to change. The effects of the industrial revolution were then being plainly manifested in England, and were gradually making themselves felt also on the Continent. The rapid growth of the population and increased prosperity stimulated building activity and created new facilities for the sale of timber. At the same time improvements were introduced in sawmill technique, which tended to cheapen production. But it was not till the middle of the nineteenth century that the great boom in timber products began in earnest.

A factor which long conduced to retard developments in the iron and timber industries was the economic policy of the State. Production was regulated and restricted in various ways by the Government. Particularly in regard to the iron industry this restrictive policy was carried to great lengths. The export of pig iron and ore was prohibited, with the intention of promoting the production of Swedish bar iron and bolstering up that commodity in the international competition. But not even the production of bar iron itself was free: on the contrary, it was strictly limited in quantity. In justification of this limitation various motives were adduced, including forest economy; but there was also a monopolistic tendency in this policy, the object being to take advantage of the favourable situation on the world market for Swedish iron. Whilst the export of Swedish bar iron was also handicapped by customs duties and other import

barriers in foreign countries, it was at the time, broadly speaking, most hampered by the restrictions which Sweden herself had imposed.

It may be asked how the trade would have developed had it not been for these monopolistic tendencies and export barriers. In that case the exports would presumably have reached a somewhat higher figure, but it seems scarcely likely that the difference would have been very marked. The demand for iron was, to all appearances, *relatively* stationary, until the Industrial Revolution created new and undreamt of possibilities for the use of that metal. Moreover, in view of the stage of technical development at that time, a larger output in Sweden would presumably have conduced to increase the costs of production.

It seems rather likely that the possibilities of expansion would have been *somewhat* more favourable in regard to the output of timber products, though no revolutionary changes could have been brought about in that field either. The artificial export barriers made themselves rather severely felt in this industry, especially during the first half of the nineteenth century. In this case the greatest impedements were the import restrictions in foreign countries. A factor of special importance was that the principal market, that of Great Britain, was at this time hedged in by prohibitive duties. There is no doubt that they severely handicapped Swedish exports, thereby also conducing to reduce Sweden's purchasing power in regard to foreign goods, including those of Great Britain.

The repercussion of the industrial revolution on the export of Swedish iron was at first rather unfavourable. The lack of fossil fuel made it impossible for Sweden to avail herself of the new technical improvements in the manufacture of iron. Swedish iron lost its former position on the world market; Sweden's share in the world production of iron dwindled rapidly, and for some time the prospects were rather gloomy. Thanks, however, to technical and economic reorganization, Swedish charcoal iron succeeded in the long run in securing a position as a high-quality product. Also from a quantitative point of view the export of iron in the middle of the century was developing satisfactorily, even if the output at that time might seem rather small, compared with a country like England with her abundance of fossil fuel. The reorganization was greatly facilitated by the abolition of the State restrictions.

The crisis thus overcome was, however, not the severest that the Swedish production of iron was destined to pass through during the course of the nineteenth century. Only a few decades after this industry had got over the depression at first entailed by the competition of coke iron, a new and still more difficult problem of adjustment was encountered. The effects of the introduction of the Bessemer and open hearth processes now made themselves felt and gave rise to the sharpening of competition, which entailed farreaching consequences in Sweden. This necessitated a successive concentration of the Swedish production of iron, which revolutionized the whole industry, entailing a much more radical reorganization than in the first half of the century. Finally the post-war period has brought with it a new wave of international competition, and it is only by dint of an unintermittent process of rationalization — based on comprehensive technical researches —, that the Swedish production of iron has been able to maintain its position as an important export industry.

True, the actual export of iron has not kept pace, even approximately, with the general increase of Swedish exports. An exact comparison with the situation during the earlier decades of the nineteenth century is scarcely possible, but we shall not be far from the truth in estimating that the actual export of iron fell from at least 50 per cent. in the eighteen-thirties to less than 10 per cent. at the end of the nineteen-twenties. The character of this export has, however, undergone a marked change. Highly finished products, on the one hand, and pig iron, on the other, have assumed great importance. But the figure of 10 per cent. in fact gives a misleading idea of the importance of the iron industry for Sweden's exports. The total export figure for the group "metals and products hereof" averaged per annum 22 per cent. during the ten-years period 1921—1930.

This higher figure is chiefly accounted for by the export of machinery and similar products. Viewed historically, engineering has been closely associated with the production of iron, and it may be stated that the long struggle of the iron industry with unfavourable circumstances greatly stimulated the technical progress which was of such fundamental importance for the engineering trade.

In considering the position held by the iron industry in Sweden's foreign trade, it should finally be borne in mind that since the end of the nineteenth century a large export of iron ore has been developed; during the years 1921—1930 it amounted, broadly speaking, to about 7 per cent. of the total export value. In this respect the new inventions, especially the Thomas process, entailed immediate advantages for Sweden. They had a very stimulating effect on the demand for iron ore, though in course of time the increasing use of scrap manifested itself as a counteracting factor. The high-grade Swedish ores were in special demand, which led to a brisk export, particularly from the Lapland mines.

The branch of export trade which was particularly characteristic of the industrial revolution in Sweden in its early phase was the timber trade. The expansion in this field was on quite a unique scale, the volume of the export being increased many times over. In fact about the beginning of the present century the export of sawn goods was about 25 times as large as at the beginning of the eighteen-thirties. In the main this development was a direct effect of the industrial revolution in other countries, especially in England. The marked growth of the population in the timber-importing countries conduced in itself to increase the demand. By far the most important factor, however, was the increase in general prosperity which industrialization brought in its train. The standard of housing accommodation was improved, and there was a very marked increase in building activity. Sweden's trade in timber products greatly profited by these circumstances. The development of this trade was also promoted by the gradual withdrawal of the prohibitive tariff policy about the middle of the nineteenth century. For the international timber trade it was of special importance that England then abolished her timber duties.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century people had been rather pessimistic in their estimates of Sweden's supplies of timber, and would doubtless have regarded a development of the Swedish sawmill industry such as actually took place during the course of the nineteenth century as something utterly inconceivable. Even a far smaller expansion would, it was supposed, deprive the iron industry of a considerable part of its supplies of charcoal. This pessimism was in part due to an underestimate of Sweden's actual timber resources. But it should also be borne in mind that the immense expansion of the export of sawn goods was connected with a technical revolution which at the beginning of the century could not have been foreseen. Transport facilities, especially during the latter half of the century, were immensely improved, and vast forests which, owing to their remote situation, could formerly not have been exploited, now became available for industrial purposes. Moreover, the productivity of the forests was steadily increased by rational culture. As for the charcoal requirements of the iron industry, technical progress led to a marked relative decrease in the consumption of charcoal, and, despite the record advance of the sawmill industry and subsequently of the wood pulp industry, there was scope for an increase in the output of iron, though indeed on a much more modest scale.

In the eighteen-seventies the export of timber products represented no less than about 45 per cent. of Sweden's total exports, reckoned in value. Quite as high figures were not reached in the sequel, though at the beginning of the present century timber products still held a rather dominant position in Sweden's exports. By that time, however, the quantitative increase had ceased, and this was soon manifested in a very considerable reduction of the percentage contributed by timber products to Sweden's total exports. This decrease was particularly marked during the post-war period, when the timber market was for the most part unsatisfactory;

thus during the years 1921—1930 the figure ranged between 20 and 21 per cent.

The stagnation in the purely quantitative development of the timber trade was due to a combination of circumstances. The actual supplies of timber ultimately set a limit, though a rather elastic one, to expansion. Furthermore, Sweden was exposed to increasingly sharp competition from countries which at the end of the century possessed larger unutilized supplies of timber. At the same time technical developments, especially in the building trade, trended in a direction which entailed a relative decrease in the consumption of timber products.

But even when the development of the sawmill industry had come to a standstill, the industries based on the forest resources continued as a whole to advance. In the latter part of the nineteenth century a new wood-consumer appeared on the scene, namely the paper pulp mills. In Sweden, as in other countries, it was the mechanical pulp industry that at first led the van. Subsequently, however, it was outdistanced by the chemical pulp industry, in the development of which Swedish technical science played a very prominent part. During the twentieth century the growth of the pulp industry proceeded with great rapidity; during the years 1921—1930 the export of paper and wood pulp amounted to 26 or 27 per cent. of the total value of Sweden's exports, thus surpassing the export trade in timber products.

The new industry entailed, in some measure, a sharper competition for the raw material required by the sawmills and, on a much larger scale, for the making of charcoal. On the other hand, the sawmill and wood pulp industries tended largerly to supplement one another, being based, to a considerable extent, on different kinds and dimensions of timber. At any rate, the pulp industry has served, in increasing measure, as an economic support for the large forest districts, and indeed for the entire national economy. Had it not been for this industry, the post-war depressions on the timber market would have had much more far-reaching effects than was actually the case. Futhermore, the pulp mills have indirectly exercised a great influence on Swedish industries by increasing the interest in chemical researches for technical purposes. Chemical industry had indeed been previously represented in Sweden, for example by the match industry, which for some time past had played a considerable part in Sweden's exports. But the growth of the wood pulp industry had the effect of inducing more systematic efforts than ever before to be concentrated on the solution of chemical problems.

The products of industry and mining overwhelmingly predominate in Sweden's exports. Agricultural produce represented merely about 11 per cent. of the total value of the exports in 1921—1930. In this branch, however, there have been marked fluctuations. At the beginning of the nineteenth century cereals and animal products showed an over-balance of imports. In the course of the century the situation changed, and an export of cereals, chiefly oats, was gradually developed, assuming at times rather considerable dimensions. This seems to have been chiefly due to the enclosure movement, which gradually led to a large extension of the area under cultivation. The export of oats, however, was a transitory phenomenon. After culminating in the eighteen-seventies, it began to fall off, so that about the beginning of the present century, it was more than counterbalanced by imports. At a considerably earlier date wheat and rye had again shown a rather large over-balance of imports.

As regards animal products the changes were of a more lasting character. Sweden became a butter-exporting country as far back as the eighteen-sixties. This export was favoured by improvements in transportation facilities and in cold-storage technique, but especially by the development of Great Britain into a butter-importing country, with a very large purchasing power. In view of these circumstances, Swedish agriculture was partly reorganized, animal production gaining in importance as compared with the cultivation of cereals. Had this tendency been allowed to proceed undisturbed, it would certainly have led to still more marked changes in the same direction than those which actually took place. At the end of the eighteen-eighties,

however, Sweden, in regard to agricultural products, abandoned the free-trade policy which she had pursued since the middle of the century. Under tariff protection the cultivation of cereals could now be more successfully maintained, though partly at the expense of a continued development of animal production and the export of oats. After an increase in the rates of duty on cereals in 1895 this tendency became still more marked. In short, the development of the export of animal products now came to a stop, though this group of commodities still continued to contribute a rather considerable percentage to Sweden's foreign trade.

In the eighteen-seventies agricultural products represented more than 25 per cent. of the total value of exports. For the years 1925—1929 the figure, as above indicated, fell to about 11 per cent., the export consisting mainly of animal products, especially butter and bacon. Some export of wheat and rye has occurred sporadically, especially in recent time, when agrarian protectionism, in Sweden as in other countries, has entailed a marked overproduction of wheat.

The export of animal products seems to have a rather uncertain future before it. Indeed agriculture in general is beset with greater difficulties in regard to export trade than almost any other branch of production. It is not merely suffering from the effects of commercial policy, it is also adversely affected by the population trend. The fall of the birth-rate and the impending decrease of the population in a number of countries, including the principal importing countries, conduce to darken the prospects of agricultural export, and indeed of agrarian production in general, in Sweden as in many other parts of the world.

Autarchic policy is also a menace to international trade in industrial products. For Sweden this is a more serious matter than agrarian protectionism, seeing that her export trade is so largely based on industrial products and related goods. Sweden is one of those countries whose foreign trade, relatively speaking, has been most highly developed, and a marked reduction of that trade would entail very serious economic and social consequences. The greater part of her abundant natural resources in timber and ores can be utilized only by export on a large scale; the home market is far too limited. Sweden's extensive export trade has made her also a relatively large buyer on the world market, and this position can be maintained only if she is permitted to carry on her export trade without too great impediments. It may be contended that Sweden has a relatively strong position, in view of the fact that such a large part of her exports is based on natural resources, for which there is a very wide market, and which it is difficult to replace. This in fact has made it more easy for Sweden to hold her own in spite of post-war dislocations in international trade. It should be borne in mind, however, that technical developments may bring surprises in their train. Such a monopoly, one might almost say, of the world market as Sweden held in the eighteenth century, the era of charcoal iron, she has never since, even approximately, attained. On the contrary, there has been an almost unintermittent trend in the direction of severer competition. This competition has been particularly marked after the war, though in certain branches attempts have been made to soften it down by international agreements. Such agreements, however, are for the most part mere palliatives. Indeed, only those industries in which persistent efforts are made to improve technical and economic organization have in the long run any prospects of success. This is a fact which is brought into sharp relief by a historical study of Sweden's exports during the past century.

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RATIONALIZATION OF THE SWEDISH STATE RAILWAYS

BY TAGE BERGER

The network of State railways in Sweden has been established and extended primarily for the purpose of bringing different parts of the country into communication with one another, thus creating a basis for the development of industry and commerce. Considerable sums have thus been invested in these railways, which, so far from improving their profitability, have been an additional charge on them, owing to the disparity between earnings and expenditure on certain poorly remunerative lines.

When, in the course of a few years, the last section of the so-called "Inland Railway" is completed, this will presumably mark the termination of the actual extension of the Swedish railway system. This, however, does not mean that the State railways may not be further saddled with unremunerative lines. In recent years a number of private railways which have fallen into financial embarrassment, and have not sufficient resources to be maintained as independent enterprises, have been incorporated in the State railways. These incorporations indicate that the development of the Swedish railway system will trend in the direction of the continuous and extended nationalization of private railways. The times in fact require that greater consideration shall be paid to the direct importance of communications for the development of industry and commerce than to the financial interests bound up therein.

Whilst the investments of capital in the Swedish State railways have thus often been such as adversely to affect profitability, the railway administration has adopted a policy of continuous rationalization, with a view to improving financial results. These conflicting tendencies naturally make it very difficult for an outsider fully to appreciate what has been achieved by this rationalization. It should further be borne in mind that the profitability of the State railways has also been affected by measures of social policy, such as the introduction of the eight hours day — though applied in a modified form to the operation of railways — as well as by the increase of real wages.

I shall now attempt to show the value and economic importance of some of the principal measures taken to rationalize the operation of the Swedish State railways. This report will be confined to the last twenty years, as it was not till after 1914 that the railways were compelled by the circumstances of the time to improve the efficiency of their transport service.

The general tendency towards successive reduction of the number of hands employed, which we find in almost all branches, is reflected as regards the State railways in the following figures (which do not include the special traffic on the ore-transporting line in Lapland).

Year	Average staff during year	Length of line km.	Train kilometres mill.	Waggon-axle kilometres mill.	Passenger kilometres mill.	Goods ton kilometres mill.
1913	26,026	4,696	23.88	844.3	1,027	1,079
1934	26,395	7,514	39.47	1,053.3	1,700	1,533

Reckoned per employee the figures work out as follows:

Year	Length of line km.	Train kilometres thousand	Waggon-axle kilometres thousand	Passenger kilometres thousand	Goods ton kilometres thousand
1913	0.180	0.918	32.4	39.5	41.5
1934	0.285	1.495	39.9	64.4	58.1
Percentage increase . . .	58	63	23	63	40

These figures strikingly show the marked increase in the performance per head from 1913 to 1934. It was in fact imperative to attain such results in order to counterbalance the effects of the increase in real wages and the shortening of the hours of labour. The total staff expenses amounted in 1913 to 40.0 million kronor and in 1934 to 100.3 million kronor, or 1,537 and 3,800 kronor respectively per head, which is tantamount to an increase of roughly 150 per cent.

The measures taken to reduce the staff have been mainly of the following character. The line service has been completely reorganized, so that line-men etc. can be employed on a larger scale on actual maintenance work. The station service has been placed on a modern basis and is kept under close observation with a view to adjusting the number of the staff to the volume of the traffic. One-man service on the engines has been initiated to a certain extent and the introduction of the vacuum brake on goods trains has resulted in the suppression of the entire staff of brakesmen.

The last-mentioned measure, which involved rather considerable investments of capital, calls for some further comment. The new system was introduced successively in the course of the years 1921—1929, and entailed a total expenditure of about 14 million kronor. In addition to the suppression of the total number of brakesmen, about 1,100 hands, this system involved a further reduction of staff in that the services of guards were no longer required on long-distance goods trains. The total saving resulting from these reductions is estimated at nearly 4 million kronor. Allowing for certain additional expenditure on the operation and upkeep of the brake apparatus, the net annual saving may be put roughly at $3^1/_2$ million kronor. The introduction of the vacuum brake on goods trains thus entails an annual saving equivalent to 25 per cent of the capital invested therein. It should be added, however, that, for technical reasons, the vacuum brake had to be installed at the same time on passenger cars. This involved an expenditure of roughly 4 million kronor, which was not compensated by any reduction of staff. The figures quoted show, however, that the saving resulting from the introduction of the new brake on goods trains amply suffices to pay off the capital expenditure on the installation of the brake on passenger cars.

Rationalization has also been carried out in two departments, which play an important part in the economy of the State railways, namely stores and workshops. Both these departments are now organized independently of the actual operation of the railways. This facilitates a survey of the entire economy, the main aim of which is a rational utilization of apparatus, materials and staff.

In regard to stores, the aim has been to keep down the stocks of materials of consumption, while constantly improving efficiency and rapidity in the execution of new orders. The results thus attained are indicated by the following figures, which relate to all materials of consumption except engine fuel. Whilst the value of the materials supplied increased from 16 million kronor in 1914 to 33 million kronor in 1934, the book value of the stock of stores was reduced during that period from 15 million kronor to about 1 million kronor.

In the workshops rationalization has proceeded on two lines. Firstly the work has been concentrated in a small number of large workshops. Secondly the work in those workshops has been specialized, concurrently with the introduction of a continuous process of work. Specialization involves the use of separate workshops for the repair of the principal groups of rolling stock, notably steam locomotives, electric locomotives, cars and trucks, as well as for parts such as buffers, couplings, etc. The new process of work is still in course of development, but has already yielded satisfactory results, as the following figures indicate. In the course of a few years the total time required for the overhauling of a goods truck at a workshop has been reduced on an average from 11.6 to 7.1 days, as regards ore trucks from 6 to 2 days.

By far the most important investments of capital in the State railways for the purpose of attaining better economic results and technical improvements in operation are accounted for by

Network of Swedish State Railways.



the extensive electrification which has been carried out during the last twenty years or so and are still proceeding.

The basis for the electrification of the Swedish State railways, and the principal reason why it was started on the Riksgräns Railway (intended for the transport of iron ore from the mines in Lapland) about twenty-five years ago was the abundant supply of water power in the country, which might be utilized in order to cut down the import of fuel. It is estimated that the aggregate existing water power in Sweden can yield about 32,000 million kilowatt hours per year. The power actually utilized in 1934 amounted to 6,050 million kilowatt hours, whereof 260 million for the electrified State railways. When the present plan of electrification has been completely carried out, the power required, according to an estimate, will be about 430 million kilowatt hours per year.

After certain experiments with the electric operation of railways, which were completed in 1908, the electrification of the northern branch of the Riksgräns Railway, the section from Kiruna to the Norwegian frontier, 130 kilometres in length, was started in 1910, with the approval of the Riksdag. The selection of this branch was due to a combination of circumstances. A new contract had at the time been concluded between the State and the mining company, involving the transport of ore on a considerably larger scale. The traffic on that railway was exceptionally heavy, very uniform and evenly distributed over the twenty-four hours. If steam traction were to be continued, the expected increase in the transport of ore would entail considerable expenditure on the re-laying of tracks, the construction of double tracks and other measures to increase the carrying capacity of the line. Electric traction would eliminate the necessity for these arrangements, besides entailing considerable advantages in regard to traffic facilities. Finally, it was thought that the technical difficulties involved by the electrification of this line, owing to the severity of the climate, would yield much valuable experience.

This line was opened for electric traction in 1915 and fully answered to expectations. The success of this first venture led to the institution of an enquiry into the practicability of electrifying also the southern branch of the railway, from Kiruna to Luleå. The upheaval, in financial and other respects, caused by the war led to the deferment of this project for several years. And when the work was at length started, under the management of the State railways themselves (which was not the case as regards the northern branch), it proceeded at a very leisurely pace. The electrification of the entire line from Kiruna to Luleå, 321 kilometres, was not completed till 1922.

The total costs of the electrification of the Riksgräns Railway amount to 51,080,000 kronor. Out of this sum 21,160,000 kronor was spent on the procuring of electric locomotives, 1,380,000 kronor on certain alterations, and the remainder, 28,540,000 kronor on the so-called transmission plant, which comprises transmission lines, transformer stations and contact lines. As an indication of the technical betterments resulting from the introduction of electric traction, it may be mentioned that the size of the ore trains has been increased by about 40 per cent, whilst the average speed has been approximately doubled.

Though the introduction of electric traction on the Riksgräns Railway distinctly pointed to the desirability of the continued electrification of the State railways, the conditions on this line were of such a special character that the success attained there was not in itself a conclusive test in favour of electrification on the scale contemplated in the plan now adopted. On the other hand, decisive importance must be attached to the very satisfactory results of the introduction of electric traction on the line from Stockholm to Gothenburg.

In the report submitted by the Railway Administration in 1920 the following reasons were adduced in favour of electrification on a large scale: The country would be less dependent on imported fuel for the operation of railways, a matter of special importance in times of international complications. From the point of view of national economy, it was highly desirable that the large sums spent on fuel should remain with-

in the country. As regards traffic, electrification involved the advantages of shorter running-times, better utilization of the track and tractive power, and much greater facilities for expansions of traffic on an economic basis. In addition to these indirect advantages, electric traction would entail an actual reduction in working expenses, even when coal prices were comparatively moderate. At the price which coal then commanded, electrification was warranted for the reason alone.

The work on the line from Stockholm to Gothenburg, 459 kilometres in length, was started in 1923, and electric traction was introduced on the whole line in 1926. The total cost of the electrification was 44,600,000 kronor. This amount includes a sum of 10,600,000 kronor for electric locomotives, which was drawn from the replacement fund, as the supply of these locomotives merely involved a replacement of engines which would normally be superannuated in the course of the next few years. This fact, which entailed a corresponding reduction of interest on the new capital invested, weighed heavily in the preliminary estimates of expenditure.

In May 1927, when electric traction had proceeded for a year, a new time-table was introduced, in accordance with which the running-times were considerably shortened. Calculations have been made by the Railway Administration with a view to ascertaining the economies effected by electric traction. These estimates show the annual costs of operation and maintenance, inclusive of interest charges and replacement, firstly with electric traction, and secondly with steam traction. The figures in both cases are for the year 1928, the first whole year in which the advantages of electric traction were fully manifested. The result showed a reduction in the costs of operation and maintenance of approximately 4,000,000 kronor, set off by an increase of 3,900,000 kronor. The last-mentioned figure includes a sum of 1,400,000 kronor, representing the interest charges on the new capital invested. The direct net profit which could be shown at that date, 100,000 kronor, may seem to be rather small. This result, however, can no longer be regarded as fully representative, as subsequent electrification and that which is now proceeding (see below) has had a bearing on the economy of the line from Stockholm to Gothenburg. In fact, the estimates of the working costs of the lines subsequently electrified have revealed considerably larger economies. For example, the net profit entailed by electric traction has been estimated — under certain stated conditions in regard to the train service — at 1,250,000 kronor for the Malmö lines and 500,000 kronor for the Ånge lines.

Incomparably greater are the advantages of electric traction in regard to traffic, as has been amply demonstrated on the line from Stockholm to Gothenburg. The most striking of improvements is the very considerable shortening in running-times. The time gained in complete runs is 2 hours for express trains, $2^1/_2$ hours for ordinary passenger trains and from 10 to 12 hours for goods trains.

That such an improvement in speed has had a stimulating effect on the travelling public is beyond all doubt. The actual use of electricity for the running of trains tends in the same direction, as freedom from soot and smoke is an advantage which the general public highly appreciate. The electrification of the head line from Stockholm to Gothenburg has also made it possible to arrange new and better connexions. How far these matters have conduced to increase the number of travellers cannot, of course, be determined with exactitude. A special investigation has, however, shown that from 1926 to 1928 the number of travellers increased by about 15 per cent on that line, but by merely 5 per cent on the other lines. On this basis, the increase in earnings due to the improved travelling facilities provided by electric traction is estimated at about 600,000 kronor.

The gain in time for goods trains amounts, as above mentioned, to 10—12 hours, whence those trains, which had previously taken about twenty-four hours, can now run the distance in one night. Whereas previously trucks, which had been loaded on a certain day, were not available for unloading till two days after, they can now be unloaded on the immediately following

day, so that the actual gain in time is twenty-four hours. This is of considerable importance from the point of view of expenditure, as the smaller number of trucks in circulation enables the rolling stock to be appreciably reduced. Thus these improvements in goods traffic, even if they cannot be measured in figures, entail great advantages, which redound to the benefit of industry and commerce.

Finally, attention should be drawn to the potential advantages of electric traction, which have been shown in a very striking manner on the line from Stockholm to Gothenburg. I am referring to the far greater facilities afforded by electric traction, as compared with steam traction, for carrying a much larger traffic than normally with an inconsiderable increase in costs. In the winter of 1929 the transport system was dislocated by the ice barrier in the southern waters of Sweden. From the 9th February to the 20th March the Sound was practically closed, and the harbours of Malmö, Hälsingborg and Halmstad were completely blocked. The result was a tremendous congestion of traffic on the line from Stockholm to Gothenburg, so that nearly three hundred special goods trains had to be put in. On the section from Gothenburg to Hallsberg the number of kilometres travelled by goods trains per kilometre of the line increased by 150—200 per cent. Had the line still been operated by steam traction, such arrangements — if possible at all — would have entailed very heavy additional expense. In view of the comparative lack of elasticity of steam traction, such heavy traffic would have necessitated a considerably larger staff of line-men. A severe strain would have been put on rolling stock and tractive power. The necessary increase in the number of men required for coaling, watering and the overhauling of engines would have been a further item of expenditure. With electric traction these additional costs could, practically speaking, be avoided. It is significant that an electric engine was employed in effective train service for 43 hours out of 48.

This greater elasticity of electric traction represents considerable economic advantages, which, however, as above indicated, cannot be exactly stated. Had steam traction been continued, it would have been necessary, at great expense, to lay down double tracks in order to carry even normal increases in traffic. As it is, this will apparently not be required for many years to come.

The electrification of the Gothenburg line and its results have been reported at some length, because they illustrate in a very clear and striking manner how electric traction compares with steam traction, economically and in regard to traffic.

On the basis of the experience gained in the electrification of the Gothenburg line, the electrification of the Swedish State railways has been continued in accordance with the following programme:

In the years 1931—1933 electric traction was introduced on the so-called Malmö lines, comprising the section Järna—Åby—Mjölby—Hässleholm—Malmö—Trälleborg, with the connecting lines Katrineholm—Åby, Örebro—Mjölby, Falköping—Nässjö and Arlöv—Lomma. This network of railway lines, totalling 862 kilometres in length, was opened in its entirety for electric traction in 1933.

In 1933 the electrification of the so-called Ånge lines, totalling 617 kilometres in length, and comprising the sections Stockholm—Krylbo—Ånge and Örebro—Krylbo, was commenced. The Stockholm—Krylbo and Örebro—Krylbo section were opened in 1934, and these works as a whole are expected to be completed at the beginning of next year.

The next step was the introduction of electric traction on the West Coast railway, that is the line from Gothenburg to Malmö, 316 kilometres in length. It was started in 1934 and is expected to be completed in 1936. The section Malmö—Ängelholm on this line was opened in 1934 and the section Ängelholm—Halmstad this year.

Finally, a network of railways, consisting of various connecting lines, altogether 526 kilometres in length, is in course of electrification: it is to be regarded as a supplement to the plan of electrification previously carried out or in course of execution. It comprises the sections Åstorp—

Mölle, Hässleholm—Veinge, Laxå—Charlottenberg, Uppsala—Gävle, and Södertälje—Eskilstuna. It is expected to be ready for operation in the course of the year 1937.

The costs of the electrification of the Swedish State railways, already carried out or in course of execution, amount to, or are estimated at, the following sums:

	Year of electrification	Length of line km.	Number of engines	Consumption of electric power per annum mill. Kw.h	Cost of electrification thousand kr.
Riksgräns Railway . .	1910/22	451	67	95	51,080
Stockholm–Gothenburg	1923/26	459	64	75	44,600
Stockholm—Malmö .	1931/33	862	105	125	63,500
Stockholm—Ånge . .	1933/36	617	80	70	49,500
Gothenburg—Malmö .	1934/36	316	43	35	27,150
Supplementary lines .	1935/37	526	42	30	29,870
Total	—	3,231	401	430	265,700

Out of the total cost of 265,700,000 kronor, 123,400,000 kronor represent expenditure on the so-called transmission plant, 48,540,000 kronor alterations of telegraph and telephone lines etc., and 93,760,000 kronor electric locomotives.

Before discussing the financing of these electrification works, it should be mentioned that in 1924 instructions were laid down by the Riksdag and Government in regard to the economy of the State railways, in accordance with which the primary aim should be a yield normally corresponding to a fair return on the borrowed capital invested in the railways. In order to uphold this rule, the Riksdag in 1929 resolved that the borrowed capital should be written off to the extent of 240,000,000 kronor. This sum represented capital bound up in unremunerative lines, 180,000,000 kronor, and over-capitalization owing to the high level of prices during the war and its aftermath, 60,000,000 kronor. This writing-off was closely connected with a new contract, concluded in 1927, between the State and the mining company regarding the transport of iron ore on the Riksgräns Railway, under which the State railways divested themselves of their claim to commercially remunerative freight rates for this large-scale transport. The State, however, having a large holding in the mining company, received the equivalent amount in another way. This sum was to be used for the amortization of a certain part, 140,000,000 kronor, of the above-mentioned amount to be written off. The remainder, 100,000,000 kronor, was written off immediately out of funds available for the amortization of the national debt. After the above-mentioned dispositions, the State capital permanently invested in the State railways figured at the end of 1934 as follows:

Borrowed capital:	Mill. kr.
the interest on which is to be paid out of earnings on railway traffic	790.8
the interest on which is to be paid out of other State revenue	162.5
Other capital	346.3
Total	1,299.6

One of the consequences of the above-mentioned instructions is that in case of new investments the question whether the money should be borrowed in the usual way or procured in some other manner is determined by the possibility of obtaining a return on the capital. This question arose also in connexion with the electrification of the railways. As a return on the capital was considered to be completely assured, borrowing was authorized for expenditure on those lines which have already been electrified, inclusive of the Ånge lines, planned in 1933. An exception was made in regard to the expenditure on electric engines, which was to be defrayed out of the replacement fund. The last-mentioned expenditure amounts to 10,600,000 kronor for the line from Stockholm to Gothenburg, 16,300,000 kronor for the Malmö lines, and 12,600,000 kronor for the Ånge lines, making altogether 39,500,000 kronor. The expenditure on the electrification of the line from Gothenburg to Malmö is likewise to be met solely by borrowing, but the Railway Administration, with a view to reducing the interest charges, had proposed that 4,000,000 kronor out of the estimated total expenditure of 27,150,000 kronor should

be drawn from the grant for unemployment relief. When afterwards the question arose of the electrification of the lines Laxå—Charlottenberg, Uppsala—Gävle, and Södertälje—Eskilstuna, it was decided, in accordance with a proposal of the Railway Administration, that only 11,000,000 kronor, out of the total estimated cost of 25,500,000 kronor, should be met out of borrowed capital requiring a return. The costs of the electrification of the lines Hässleholm—Veinge and Åstorp—Mölle, 4,100,000 kronor, have been defrayed out of savings on the Malmö lines, the costs of which were 6,500,000 lower than the estimate.

As previously mentioned, the electrification works include also the removal of certain low-tension lines belonging to the Telegraph Administration. Some part of the cost, corresponding to the fundable saving on working expenses, will subsequently be transferred to the capital account of the latter administration, where this has not already been done. If the last-mentioned amount is estimated at 5,000,000 kronor, the total costs of the plan of electrification already carried out or in course of execution will be distributed as follows:

	Mill. kr.
Borrowed capital requiring a return	206.7
Other capital	14.5
Replacement fund	39.5
Telegraph Administration account	5.0
Total	265.7

The observations made above regarding the economic advantages of the introduction of electric traction on the line from Stockholm to Gothenburg are applicable, broadly speaking, to the entire present plan of electrification. The estimated net saving on expenditure was indeed not so large in regard to the supplementary lines last planned, which explains why they are to be partly financed otherwise than by borrowing. The smaller net saving is connected with the cost of engine fuel. The quantity of coal which would normally be required for the network of lines now to be electrified if they were operated by steam traction would be about 550,000 tons per annum. The present price of coal for fuel is about 20 kronor per ton, but during the war and for some years afterwards was much higher, namely 170 kronor in 1918, 80 kronor in 1921, and 35 kronor as late as 1923. An increase of merely one krona in the price of coal thus involves a saving of more than half a million kronor for the State railways. Another factor of considerable importance in regard to working expenses is that the so-called "floating costs" are reduced in electric traction, so that, as already pointed out, the railways are enabled to carry a much heavier traffic than normally with a comparatively small increase in expenditure. This renders it possible for the State railways to offer lower rates for the carriage of goods, in conjunction with greater rapidity and efficiency in transport. The importance of these matters for the development of trade and commerce can scarcely be denied. Figures for the length of track and transport service in 1934 on the lines already electrified or in course of electrification are given in the subjoined table:

	Electric traction			Steam traction	State railways as a whole
	Riksgräns Railway	Other lines	Total		
Length of track: km.	451	2,780	3,231	4,202	7,433
per cent	6.1	37.4	43.5	56.5	100.0
Train km.: thousand	1,735	26,285	28,020	11,775	39,795
per cent	4.4	66.0	70.4	29.6	100.0
per km. of line	3,847	9,455	8,672	2,802	5,354
Waggon-axle km.: mill.	104 5	780.3	884.8	234.1	1,118.9
per cent	9.3	69.8	79.1	20.9	100.0
per km. of line thousand	232	281	274	56	151

The above figures show that, whilst the electrified lines cover only somewhat more than 40 per cent, of the total lines in length, they represent about 80 per cent. of the entire transport service of the State railways, measured in waggon-axle kilometres. On the electrified lines about five times as many waggon-axle kilometres are run per kilometre of the line as on

the sections operated by steam traction, and three times as many train kilometres. It is rather significant for the State railways, viewed as a commercial undertaking, that on about 60 per cent. of their total lines only about 20 per cent. of their paid traffic is carried.

To judge by the present attitude of the State authorities to electrification, the works now proceeding will presumably not mark its completion. Any future plans in this direction will, of course, be based on careful calculations. It seems that the estimates already made by the Railway Administration with regard to profitability have been very cautious. It should also be noted that the economic advantages of the adoption of electric traction will apparently become more manifest when the greater part of the network of railways has been electrified. It has further been pointed out that, in considering the profitability of electric traction, it is rather a mistake to fix attention merely on the remunerativeness of the individual lines, instead of surveying the system as a whole. If this point of view is adopted by the competent authorities, it seems that a basis exists for a considerably extended programme of electrification.

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1935

The General Situation. On the home market the situation has been, broadly speaking, satisfactory also during the past quarter, whilst sales and prices for certain branches of export have shown a deterioration. The increase in activity resulting from the settlement of the dispute in the building trade in February 1934 has continued to make itself felt in a marked degree, and branches of industry closely associated with building have latterly had a good season. The production of iron has been on a record scale, concurrently with a considerable importation of builders' iron. The foodstuffs factories, the textile mills and the makers of ready-made clothing for the most part report satisfactory business, though the boom in the textile industries, which has been of long duration, has become less marked. In the leather, boot and rubber industries business activity is reported to be greater than at the same season last year.

As regards the export industries, the large engineering workshops have rather considerably increased their sales all along the line. After a decline during the first quarter the export of pig iron has again increased, whilst the export of wrought iron and steel has been maintained at last year's level.

The situation is less satisfactory in regard to the products of the timber and pulp industries. Great uncertainty on the timber market has been caused by the delay in the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement regarding sawn wood goods, as well as by the low prices stipulated for in that agreement. In June, however, business in this branch freshened up and larger sales were made at firmer prices. At the end of the first half-year the sales of Swedish timber amounted to about 500,000 standards. The pulp mills have sold the greater part of their estimated output for the year. The prices of chemical pulp, especially sulphate, have been maintained. The market for mechanical pulp has been dull, the export figures being lower than last year.

Of the general business statistics, figures for

The Skandinaviska Bank's Business Activity Index.

Index numbers for clearing, in kronor (1929 = 100).



Exports	Wood Goods 1,000 m³	Wood Pulp (estimated air-dry weight 1,000 tons)				Paper and Paste-board 1,000 tons
		Mechanical	Sulphite	Sulphate	Total	
Jan.—May						
1929 . . .	1,191	79.8	291.3	147.4	518.5	189.00
1930 . . .	1,407	83.0	278.7	111.1	472.8	186.58
1931 . . .	547	62.8	188.3	104.5	355.6	164.35
1932 . . .	801	44.8	156.9	114.3	316.0	201.64
1933 . . .	871	101.9	249.0	143.9	494.7	199.53
1934 . . .	879	110.2	317.3	218.0	645.5	224.82
1935 . . .	767	86.5	321.7	227.1	635.3	252.59

Exports	Iron Ore 1,000 tons	Pig Iron etc. 1,000 tons	Wrought Iron and Steel 1,000 tons	Workshop[1] Products Mill. kr.	Butter tons	Bacon tons
Jan.—May						
1929 . .	3,218	24.42	55.66	44.9	9,289	8,010
1930 . .	4,366	17.96	44.24	54.8	11,974	10,814
1931 . .	1,583	16.75	31.19	36.8	8,998	13,677
1932 . .	729	10.30	24.99	26.5	5,684	10,354
1933 . .	910	24.82	24.66	23.4	5,245	8,399
1934 . .	2,227	27.46	40.95	28.9	9,195	8,698
1935 . .	2,916	34.25	40.95	33.1	8.921	5,652

traffic and production up to April 1935 inclusive are now at hand. As per these figures the traffic in the harbours and on the railways has increased and the industrial production has been maintained at a high level. The production for export, however, has declined during the month of April. According to such statistics of the Labour Office as principally concerns the supply of work in the industries this supply has remained nearly unchanged from the third quarter of 1934 up to the first quarter of 1935, both inclusive. The business activity index of the Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget referring to the clearing turnover of commercial paper free of seasonal variations, also indicates a certain stagnation in recent time. The index number which last year was varying around 88 showed in the two first quarters of 1935 86.8 and 90.2 respectively (the average figure for 1929 being 100). Considering the fall of prices since 1929 the index, however, seems to indicate a larger volume of business than in the said year of boom.

Sweden's foreign trade during the first five months shows a continued increase. Since the middle of last year, however, the imports have increased in greater measure than the exports, so that the import surplus (normal at this season) for the first five months amounted to 105 million kronor this year, as against 62 and 85 million kronor during the same period in 1934 and 1933. It should be noted that for the two immediately preceding years the surplus of income

[1] Includes only the products of large exporting workshops.

Employment in the industry.

The curve represents the supply of work[1] as stated by the Labour Office (scale right).
The columns signify the number of working-hours in the industry (scale left).



[1] The season variations have been eliminated.

Price Index of the Board of Trade.

——— = all goods.
- - - - - - - - = raw products.
(Average 1913 = 100.)



Index Numbers for Shares of 11 typical Swedish Industrial Companies.



Laid up Swedish Tonnage.

(1,000 tons gross)



Millions of Axle-Kilometers travelled by Loaded Goods Trucks on the State Railways.

Import of Sweden.



Export of Sweden.



Export of Paper Pulp.

(Estimated air-dry weight in 1,000 tons.)



Export of Woodgoods.

(1,000 m³.)

Export of Products of the Engineering Works.

(Mill. kr.)



Import of Coal and Coke.

(1,000 tons.)



Everywhere except in the first diagram the dotted line — where it occurs — indicates the original figures and the solid line the moving 12 months' averages.

in Sweden's balance of payments during the first half-year was 40 to 60 million kronor, as compared with 140 to 160 million kronor during the second half-year. With the present trend of foreign trade the surplus of income for the first half-year seems to be about to disappear.

	Imports	Exports	Surplus of imports
	Million kronor		
Jan.—May 1929	672	594	78
» » 1930	697	600	97
» » 1931	572	392	180
» » 1932	470	341	129
» » 1933	426	341	85
» » 1934	506	444	62
» » 1935	567	462	105

The payments passing between Sweden and foreign countries have enabled the Swedish banks in the last years to accumulate larger reserves of foreign exchange than ever before. Latterly tendencies toward a flight of capital from foreign countries to Sweden have been noticeable, chiefly in the form of enquiries regarding opportunities for investment. There have, however, been some actual sales of Swedish bonds and shares in this connection, as well as some transfer of foreign balances to Swedish banks. These movements, however, have been on a rather small scale.

According to the statistics, the banks since January have increased their advances by 94 million kronor. This increase is indeed only about 2.5 per cent., but is characteristic of Swedish banks in general, and confirms the views in banking circles that there is at present a somewhat greater demand for advances, especially building loans and small business credits. The seasonal decrease in deposits due to the payment of taxes and company dividends has been less marked this year than previously, and the banks have disposed only of about one-fourth of their big cash reserves, or an amount corresponding to the expansion of credits.

The greater demand for credits for building have, of course, made themselves particularly felt in the mortgage banks, which have floated new bond loans for the purpose. The more abundant material thus supplied to the bond market has conduced to bring down the prices of gilt-edged securities, including State bonds, entailing an increase in the yield of the 3 per cents State loans from 3 % at the beginning of the year to about 3.25 % in June. The level of interest on the capital market otherwise shows a lack of uniformity, which is due to the fact that municipal loans and first-class mortgages within half the assessed value of the property can be placed direct with investing institutions. Leading savings banks in certain parts of the country, for example, offer to take such loans at $2^3/_4$ to 3 per cent. In anticipation of a rise in the level of interest investors often content themselves with a lower yield on short-term loans. The average discount for three months treasury bills at the last issue fell to 0.38 per cent.

The Stock Market. The fluctuations in the prices of leading industrial and bank shares on the Stockholm Exchange during the last few months are shown by the following table, where the quotations are given in percentage of par.

	Number of Companies	1935					
		15/2	15/3	15/4	15/5	14/6	28/6
Engineering Workshops	4	135	132	136	142	137	141
Timber and Paper Industries	5	135	127	127	125	122	126
Combined Industries (wood and iron)	2	145	141	144	148	147	149
Total above Companies	**11**	**139**	**133**	**136**	**138**	**136**	**139**
Banking Companies	4	170	164	160	161	166	167

After the fall in prices in March there has been a slight rising tendency, which, however, is not fully shown in the figures, in which no adjustment has been made in respect of the cashing of dividend coupons. Transactions in shares have, however, been on a smaller scale, though there has been some improvement in June.

The Bond Market. The following table gives approximative figures for the yield on representative Swedish bond loans during the last few months.

Swedish Government.	Number of loans	1935 15/1	25/2	15/3	26/4	14/5	14/6	28/6
3 % Rente	1	3.03	3.04	3.09	3.18	3.15	3.18	3.26
4 % Amort 1932—81. Conv. 1941	1	2.43	2.22	2.48	2.66	2.66	2.57	2.88
Mortgage Banks.								
4 % Conv. 1941 . . .	2	2.22	2.18	2.46	2.66	2.64	2.82	2.93
4 % Amort 1884—1959	1	3.43	3.25	3.23	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
City of Stockholm.								
4 % Amort 1881—1936	1	3.20	3.00	3.20	2.75	3.00	2.75	3.52
4½ % Amort 1918—57. Conv. 1940	1	3.09	3.14	3.33	3.43	3.24	3.20	3.60
Industrial Companies.								
4½ % Conv. 1940 . .	1	3.23	3.10	3.14	3.14	3.19	3.06	3.11
5 % Conv. 1936—42 .	5	3.59	3.59	3.57	3.58	3.60	3.71	3.72

As previously mentioned, the prices of gilt-edged bonds have declined. In regard to certain Government loans, however, prices have been kept up by a demand from foreign countries. As for industrial loans, the situation has remained practically unchanged. Issuers of bonds have taken advantage of the situation for further conversions on a considerable scale, and, as pointed out in a previous survey, loans which have not been directly announced as conversions have nevertheless been intended wholly or partially to replace loans previously called in.

Among foreign loans on the Swedish market, we note a recently issued Norwegian 3½ % Government loan of 20 million kronor at a price of 97 per cent. The Young loan, the interest coupon of which for the 1st June was defaulted, was then struck off the official stock exchange list.

Conversions and new issues on the bond market during the second quarter of 1935.

Issuer	Interest in per cent.	Nominal amount in kr.	Issue price in per cent.
Royal Swedish Mortgage Bank (Ser. II)	3	100,000,000 whereof now issued 12,000,000	96
Swedish Cities' Mortgage Bank (Ser. I)	3	50,000,000 [1]	—
D:o	3½	58,000,000 [2]	102
AB. Stockholms Tomträttskassa .	3	6,362,000 [3]	99
Nora Bergslags Järnvägs AB. . .	4	3,500,000	100
Stockholm—Västerås—Bergslagens Nya Järnvägs AB.	3½	6,646,000 [3]	100
Trafik AB. Grängesberg–Oxelösund	4	13,285,000 [3]	101
Bergvik och Ala Nya AB. . . .	3½	4,000,000	100
Holmens Bruks och Fabriks AB.	4	12,000,000 [4]	102½
Kinnaströms Väfveri AB.	4	800,000	101½
Strömsnäs Jernverks AB.	4	3,000,000	101
Svenska AB. Gasaccumulator . .	4	3,000,000 [4]	102
Norwegian Government	3½	20,000,000	97

[1] Being sold privately at the price obtainable on the market.
[2] Also, in connexion with conversion, at a price of 101 %.
[3] Reduction of the interest on a previous bond loan.
[4] Also, in connexion with conversion, at a price of 102 %.

Some Statistical Data Concerning

Currency Reserve, Stock of Gold, Note Circulation.

	Net Claims of Banks on Abroad million kronor (End of month)									The Riksbank's								
	Riksbank			Commercial banks			Total			Stock of Gold (million kr.)			Stock of Gold and Net Claims on Abroad (million kr.)			Note Circulation (million kr.)		
	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935
Jan.	259	449	560	205	125	189	464	574	759	206	372	351	465	821	911	508	565	620
Feb.	260	506	555	218	85	200	478	591	755	206	373	351	466	879	906	506	560	620
March	308	507	600	161	77	150	469	584	750	232	374	352	540	881	952	531	644	646
I (Average)	**276**	**487**	**572**	**195**	**96**	**180**	**470**	**583**	**752**	**215**	**373**	**351**	**490**	**860**	**923**	**515**	**586**	**629**
April	257	484	609	169	103	149	426	587	758	266	367	352	523	851	961	549	581	652
May	263	458	622	185	130	159	448	588	781	266	368	354	529	826	976	525	564	632
June	318	445	614	164	171		482	616		266	370	355	584	815	969	524	602	674
II (Average)	**279**	**462**	**615**	**173**	**135**		**452**	**597**		**266**	**368**	**354**	**545**	**831**	**969**	**533**	**582**	**653**
July	305	457		116	188		421	645		340	371		645	828		531	572	
Aug.	307	471		116	192		423	663		361	373		668	844		513	596	
Sept.	342	469		100	195		442	664		378	374		720	843		625	634	
III (Average)	**318**	**466**		**111**	**192**		**429**	**657**		**360**	**373**		**678**	**838**		**556**	**601**	
Oct.	394	510		106	195		500	705		377	359		771	869		589	632	
Nov.	425	519		105	186		530	706		369	352		794	871		574	622	
Dec.	446	553		106	225		552	778		370	351		816	904		598	672	
IV (Average)	**422**	**527**		**106**	**202**		**528**	**730**		**372**	**354**		**794**	**881**		**587**	**642**	
Notes	The figures comprise balances with foreign banks and holdings of foreign bills and foreign bonds less amounts due to foreign banks									At end of month.						Monthly averages		

Rates of Exchange.

	Nominal Quotations of the Commercial Banks (Monthly Averages)											
	London Kr. for £ 1			New York Kr. for $ 1			Paris Kr. for 100 francs			Berlin Kr. for 100 Rmk		
	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935
Jan.	18.382	19.400	19.404	5.471	3.848	3.972	21.490	23.996	26.187	130.720	145.430	159.558
Feb.	18.765	19.400	19.405	5.482	3.863	3.988	21.648	25.052	26.308	131.448	150.990	160.104
March	18.919	19.400	19.401	5.485	3.822	4.072	21.806	25.166	27.028	131.788	151.890	164.990
I (Average)	**18.689**	**19.400**	**19.403**	**5.479**	**3.844**	**4.011**	**21.648**	**24.738**	**26.508**	**131.652**	**149.437**	**161.551**
April	19.073	19.404	19.400	5.335	3.771	4.019	21.968	24.979	26.567	130.852	149.656	162.337
May	19.447	19.405	19.400	4.944	3.806	3.975	22.767	25.194	26.217	136.019	150.650	160.481
June	19.456	19.405	19.400	4.718	3.850	3.938	22.652	25.418	26.066	135.935	148.340	159.648
II (Average)	**19.325**	**19.405**	**19.400**	**4.999**	**3.809**	**3.977**	**22.462**	**25.197**	**26.283**	**134.269**	**149.549**	**160.822**
July	19.407	19.403		4.194	3.857		22.835	25.437		139.750	148.288	
Aug.	19.400	19.400		4.315	3.836		23.187	25.563		141.481	151.417	
Sept.	19.400	19.400		4.173	3.888		24.218	26.008		148.154	156.830	
III (Average)	**19.402**	**19.400**		**4.227**	**3.860**		**23.413**	**25.669**		**143.128**	**152.178**	
Oct.	19.400	19.400		4.166	3.936		24.296	26.130		148.413	159.472	
Nov.	19.401	19.402		3.797	3.895		23.788	25.688		145.375	156.837	
Dec.	19.400	19.400		3.798	3.929		23.331	25.948		142.333	158.198	
IV (Average)	**19.400**	**19.401**		**3.920**	**3.920**		**23.805**	**25.922**		**145.374**	**158.169**	
Par	18.1595			2.2038 [1]			14.6196			88.8889		

[1] On the 30th January 1934 the value of the dollar was provisionally fixed at 59.06 % of the former gold parity, Kr. 3.7315 per $.

N. B. England abandoned the gold standard on the 21th Sept., Sweden on the 28th Sept. 1931 and the United States on the 20th April 1933.

Sweden's Economic Position.

Commercial Banks, Stock Exchange.

	Commercial banks: Deposits (million kr.)			Commercial banks: Loans incl. bills rediscounted (million kr.)			Commercial banks: Bills Rediscounted (million kr.)			Commercial banks: Cash (million kr.)			Quotations of 11 typical Swedish Industrial Shares [1] In %			Shares sold on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (1000 kr.)		
	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935
Jan.	3615	3665	3617	4138	3813	3826	54	0.4	0.0	210	435	382	85	116	139	359	1061	927
Feb.	3635	3659	3619	4134	3807	3852	18	0.5	0.0	165	485	359	77	122	139	337	1354	583
March	3621	3659	3663	4160	3830	3906	34	0.7	0.0	191	442	390	86	122	133	373	673	531
I (Average)	**3624**	**3661**	**3633**	**4177**	**3817**	**3861**	**35**	**0.5**	**0.0**	**189**	**454**	**374**	**83**	**120**	**137**	**356**	**1029**	**680**
April	3611	3628	3620	4146	3833	3917	38	0.2	0.0	187	411	360	90	122	136	494	728	441
May	3538	3553	3586	4082	3838	3920	47	0.1	0.0	156	317	284	96	127	138	645	689	618
June	3527	3559		4070	3823		54	0.0		188	307		105	121	139	487	395	705
II (Average)	**3559**	**3580**		**4099**	**3831**		**46**	**0.1**		**177**	**345**		**97**	**123**	**138**	**542**	**604**	**588**
July	3641	3629		4012	3800		24	0.0		349	401		106	121		376	338	
Aug.	3640	3628		3997	3810		0.9	0.0		341	399		104	125		305	355	
Sept.	3665	3649		3966	3816		0.8	0.0		398	391		104	128		474	469	
III (Average)	**3649**	**3635**		**3992**	**3809**		**8.6**	**0.0**		**363**	**397**		**105**	**125**		**385**	**387**	
Oct.	3669	3665		3919	3774		0.7	0.0		474	430		106	133		702	1007	
Nov.	3627	3562		3899	3785		0.7	0.0		359	299		105	134		504	549	
Dec.	3629	3553		3905	3795		0.6	0.0		390	349		105	134		554	670	
IV (Average)	**3642**	**3593**		**3908**	**3785**		**0.7**	**0.0**		**408**	**359**		**105**	**134**		**587**	**742**	
Notes	Deposits from and loans to the public within the country (at the end of the respective month)									Cash in hand, credit balances on cheque accounts with the Riksbank et cetera			Prices at middle of month			Averages per Stock Exchange business day		

[1] Revised figures.

Rates of Interest and Price Level.

	Rediscount Rate of the Riksbank (%)			Yield of Bonds (%): Govt. Loans			Yield of Bonds (%): Industrial Loans			Wholesale Price Index (Board of Trade) (1913 = 100): All Goods			Wholesale Price Index (Board of Trade) (1913 = 100): Raw Materials			Cost of Living Index (July 1914 = 100)		
	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935
Jan.	3.50	2.00	2.00	4.05	3.65	3.03	4.88	4.22	3.59	106	112	115	107	108	112	154	153	155
Feb.	3.50	2.00	2.00	4.12	3.74	3.04	4.96	4.18	3.59	106	112	115	107	110	112	.	.	.
March	3.50	2.00	2.00	4.26	3.74	3.09	4.95	4.04	3.57	105	112	115	107	109	111	.	.	.
I (Average)	**3.50**	**2.00**	**2.00**	**4.14**	**3.71**	**3.05**	**4.93**	**4.15**	**3.58**	**106**	**112**	**115**	**107**	**109**	**112**			
April	3.50	2.00	2.00	4.32	3.72	3.18	4.93	3.93	3.58	105	113	115	106	110	111	153	153	155
May	3.50	2.00	2.00	4.24	3.60	3.15	4.92	3.92	3.60	106	113	115	107	110	111	.	.	
June	2.50	2.00	2.00	4.19	3.63	3.18	4.84	3.85	3.71	106	114		107	111		.	.	
II (Average)	**3.17**	**2.00**	**2.00**	**4.25**	**3.65**	**3.17**	**4.90**	**3.90**	**3.63**	**106**	**113**		**107**	**110**				
July	2.50	2.00		4.13	3.64		4.83	3.94		108	114		108	111		153	155	
Aug.	2.50	2.00		4.01	3.61		4.76	3.83		108	114		105	109		.	.	
Sept.	2.50	2.00		3.92	3.49		4.58	3.67		109	114		106	109		.	.	
III (Average)	**2.50**	**2.00**		**4.02**	**3.58**		**4.77**	**3.81**		**108**	**114**		**106**	**110**				
Oct.	2.50	2.00		3.79	3.38		4.46	3.54		109	114		106	111		154	155	
Nov.	2.50	2.00		3.86	3.37		4.46	3.56		110	115		107	112		.	.	
Dec.	2.00	2.00		3.74	3.26		4.37	3.66		110	115		107	113		.	.	
IV (Average)	**2.33**	**2.00**		**3.80**	**3.34**		**4.41**	**3.59**		**110**	**115**		**107**	**112**				
Notes	Monthly averages			Calculated on market prices at middle of months						Calculated on prices ruling at middle of months						Refers to end of quarters		

Trade and Industry.

	Foreign Trade (million kr.)									Export of Forest Products								
	Import			Export			Excess of Imports (−) or Exports (+)			Sawn and Planed Wood Goods 1000 stds			Paper Pulp 1000 tons			Paper and Pasteboard 1000 tons		
	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935
Jan.	81	98	109	68	89	83	−13	− 9	−26	35	18	31	133.6	159.5	142.0	36.2	44.4	43.5
Feb.	75	90	99	59	66	80	−16	−24	−19	12	7	8	59.9	77.3	88.6	38.9	37.0	47.6
March	90	100	111	61	83	82	−29	−17	−29	10	11	10	31.0	52.6	46.0	42.2	51.2	52.5
I (Average)	**82**	**96**	**106**	**63**	**79**	**82**	**−19**	**−17**	**−24**	**19**	**12**	**16**	**72.4**	**96.5**	**92.2**	**39.1**	**44.2**	**47.9**
April	90	109	126	68	92	100	−22	−17	−26	18	22	15	102.4	168.9	170.3	42.1	45.8	54.1
May	90	109	122	86	112	117	− 4	+ 3	− 5	76	81	68	167.9	187.2	188.4	40.2	46.4	53.1
June	80	103		94	125		+14	+22		121	146		175.7	183.4		35.4	46.3	
II (Average)	**87**	**107**		**83**	**110**		**− 4**	**+ 3**		**72**	**83**		**148.7**	**179.8**		**39.2**	**46.2**	
July	80	99		99	109		+19	+10		118	107		201.6	172.8		46.7	42.9	
Aug.	92	113		103	116		+11	+ 3		89	110		208.3	159.2		47.4	45.5	
Sept.	98	110		117	126		+19	+16		98	95		214.5	197.2		49.3	47.3	
III (Average)	**90**	**107**		**106**	**117**		**+16**	**+10**		**102**	**104**		**208.1**	**170.4**		**47.8**	**45.2**	
Oct.	108	129		105	115		− 3	−14		93	98		195.9	177.5		45.4	45.1	
Nov.	109	128		114	120		+ 5	− 8		100	86		207.2	202.3		46.8	53.4	
Dec.	98	110		108	139		+10	+29		81	71		221.5	264.0		45.9	49.4	
IV (Average)	**105**	**122**		**109**	**125**		**+ 4**	**+ 2**		**91**	**85**		**208.2**	**214.6**		**46.0**	**49.3**	
Notes										Petersburg standard = 4.67 m³			Estimated air-dry weight					

	Export of Iron Ore 1000 tons			Export of Workshop Products million kr.			Index of Production according to Feder. of Swed. Industries			Supply of Industrial Work Index numbers			Waggon-axle Kilometres of loaded Trucks on State Railways			Unemployment in Trade Unions (%)		
	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935	1933	1934	1935
Jan.	180	178	463	4.08	4.90	5.23	87	103	116	·	·	·	25.6	29.6	34.1	28.8	24.3	22.5
Feb.	198	196	442	4.77	5.89	6.08	89	104	117	·	·	·	26.4	30.5	35.3	27.6	24.4	20.2
March	211	395	539	4.81	6.12	7.42	89	107	120	·	·	·	32.6	36.5	41.0	28.6	23.6	18.5
I (Average)	**196**	**256**	**481**	**4.55**	**5.64**	**6.24**	**88**	**105**	**117**	**2.30**	**3.24**	**3.51**	**28.2**	**32.2**	**36.8**	**28.3**	**24.1**	**20.4**
April	220	491	574	5.23	5.92	7.55	84	110	118	·	·		30.1	35.2	37.5	25.5	19.5	15.6
May	209	571	484	4.56	6.12	6.86	87	111		·	·		29.5	35.1		21.9	15.3	
June	242	606	459	4.91	6.81		85	112		·	·		28.4	36.1		21.0	13.9	
II (Average)	**224**	**556**	**506**	**4.90**	**6.28**		**85**	**111**		**2.69**	**3.55**		**29.3**	**35.5**		**22.8**	**16.2**	
July	266	580		5.28	6.39		87	108		·	·		29.8	35.4		19.4	12.8	
Aug.	297	568		4.97	7.67		91	112		·	·		32.3	38.3		19.6	13.2	
Sept.	273	567		6.07	6.99		90	112		·	·		34.4	39.0		19.2	13.0	
III (Average)	**279**	**572**		**5.44**	**7.02**		**89**	**111**		**2.94**	**3.63**		**32.2**	**37.6**		**19.4**	**13.0**	
Oct.	220	521		5.20	6.64		93	111		·	·		32.9	38.3		20.1	14.8	
Nov.	321	456		5.69	7.54		100	114		·	·		31.4	36.9		22.3	17.1	
Dec.	245	546		5.85	7.82		101	114		·	·		30.1	33.6		27.2	23.6	
IV (Average)	**262**	**508**		**5.38**	**7.33**		**98**	**113**		**3.08**	**3.59**		**31.5**	**36.3**		**23.2**	**18.5**	
Notes	Shipments of the Grängesberg Co.			Motors, electr. machinery, ball bearings, separators, telephones, etc.			Seasonal change removed Revised figures			The figure 3 denotes normal supply of work			Million kilom. per month			% of total members at end of month		

Stockholm 1935. Kgl. Boktr. P. A. Norstedt & Söner 352112

Quotations of Swedish Bonds. — *Kursnotierungen für schwedische Obligationen.*

In percentage; ex interest. — *In %, exclusive Zinsen.*

July 1935
Juli 1935

Quoted on the Stock Exchange	Terms of Redemption *Tilgungsmodalitäten* D = Drawings *Auslosung* P = Purchase *Rückkauf* R = Perpetual Loan *Staatsrente*	Redeemable in Whole *Konvertibel*	Interest Dates *Zinstermine* *	Prices (bid) *Notierungen (Geld)* 1935 29/3	30/4	31/5	28/6	2/7
Swedish Government 3 % 1888	R	1888	1/2—1/8	95	96	95 1/2	92 3/4	92
» 3 » 1894	Before *Vor* 31/12 1950 D P		15/4—15/10	100	100 1/4	99 1/2	97 1/2	97
» 3 » 1934	R	30/12 1944	30/6—30/12	—	96 1/4	97 3/4	97 3/4	96 3/4
» 3 1/2 » 1886	1887—1961 D	1906	1/6—1/12	102	102 1/4	102 1/4	—	—
» 3 1/2 » 1900 à Kr. 1 816				103	102 1/2	102 1/4	100 1/2	100 1/2
» » » à Kr. 9 080 & 18 160	R	1920	15/2—15/8	103	102 1/2	102 1/4	100	100 1/2
» 3 1/2 » 1904/06/07	R	1914/16/20	1/2—1/8	102 1/4	102 1/4	102 1/4	100	100 1/2
» 3 1/2 » 1908	R	1920	20/6—20/12	103 1/4	103	103	102	102
» 3 1/2 » 1911	R	1926	1/3—1/9	102 1/4	102 1/4	102 1/4	100 1/2	100 1/2
» 3 1/2 » 1933	R	1/11 1943	1/5—1/11	104 1/2	103 3/4	103 3/4	101 3/4	101 3/4
» 3 1/2 » 1934	1945—1974 D	1/10 1944	1/4—1/10	106	105 3/4	104 3/4	—	102 1/4
» 4 » 1931	1932—1981 D P[1]	15/5 1941	15/5—15/11	106 1/4	108	107 1/2	106 1/2	106
» 4 » 1933	R	15/3 1943	15/3—15/9	106 1/4	108 1/2	108	106 1/2	106 1/4
» 4 » 1933	R	1/10 1943	1/4—1/10	106 1/4	108 1/2	108	106 1/4	106
» 4 » 1933	1934—1958 D P[2]	15/10 1944	15/4—15/10	107	107 1/2	108	106 1/2	106 1/4
» 4 1/2 » 1927	R	15/6 1937	15/6—15/12	105	105 1/4	104 3/4	103 3/4	103 1/2
» 4 1/2 » 1929	R	15/12 1939	15/6—15/12	107 3/4	108	108 1/4	107 1/2	107 1/4
» 4 1/2 » 1930	R	15/9 1940	15/3—15/9	109	109 3/4	109 1/4	108	107 3/4
» 4 1/2 » 1932	R	15/4 1942	15/4—15/10	111 1/2	113 1/4	112 1/4	—	110
Sveriges Allm. Hypoteksbank 3 1/2 % 1886	1888—1962 D	1901	1/5—1/11	101 3/4	102 1/2	102	100 1/2	100 3/4
(Royal Swedish Mortgage Bank) 3 1/2 » 1889	1890—1959 D	1898	15/3—15/9	101 3/4	—	—	101	101
3 3/4 » 1934	1935—1994 D P	15/7 1994	15/1—15/7	105	105	—	102 3/4	102 1/2
» » 4 » 1878	1884—1959 D P		30/6—31/12	107	108	108 1/4	108	107
» » 4 » 1879	1880—1/81939 D		1/2—1/8	101 1/2	—	102	101	101
	Twice a year. *Zweimal jährlich.*							
» » 4 » 1908	1909—1968 D P	1918	1/3—1/9	—	—	104	—	105
» » 4 » 1931	1932—1991 D P	15/6 1941	15/6—15/12	106	107 1/2	107 1/4	—	105
» » 4 » 1933	1943—2003 D P	1/12 1943	1/6—1/12	107	108	108	106	—
» » 4 1/2 » 1927	1947—2007 D P	1/6 1937	1/6—1/12	106 1/4	105 1/2	105	104 1/2	103 3/4
» » 4 1/2 » 1929	1949—2009 D P	15/10 1939	15/4—15/10	107	108	108	108	107 1/2
» » 4 1/2 » 1931	1951—2011 D P	1/6 1941	1/6—1/12	—	112 1/2	—	—	110
» » 5 » 1926	1946—2005 D P	15/6 1936	15/6—15/12	—	104	104	102	102 1/4
Kon. Sveriges Stadshypotekskassa . . 3 » 1934	1944—2008 D P	1/5 1944	1/5—1/11	96 3/4	96 1/4	95	92	91 3/4
(Swedish Cities' Mortgage Bank) 3 » 1935	1945—2009 D P	15/3 1945	15/3—15/9	—	—	—	92 1/4	91 1/2
3 1/2 » 1910	Before *Vor* 31/12 1980 D P	1920	15/5—15.11	102 1/4	103	102 1/2	101 3/4	101
» » 3 1/2 » 1933	1943—2002 D P	15/6 1943	15/6—15/12	104	103 1/2	103	101 3/4	102
» » 3 1/2 » 1935 Ser. I	1945—2004 D P	15/1 1945	15/1—15/7	104 1/2	103 3/4	103	102	102
» » 4 » 1931	1941—2000 D P	1/2 1941	1/2—1/8	106 1/2	108	107	105	105
» » 4 » 1934	1944—2003 D P	15/1 1944	15/1—15/7	106 3/4	108 3/4	108 1/4	105 1/2	105 1/2
» » 4 1/2 » 1927	1937—1986 D P	1/3 1937	1/3—1/9	105 3/4	106	105 1/2	104	104
» » 4 1/2 » 1930	1940—1989 D P	1/6 1940	1/6—1/12	109 3/4	109 1/2	109 1/2	107	107
» » 4 1/2 » 1932	1942—1991 D P	1/1 1942	1/2—1/8	112 1/4	113	112	110 1/2	110 1/4
» » 4 1/2 » 1933	1943—1992 D P	1/4 1943	1/4—1/10	113 1/2	114	112 3/4	110	110 1/2
» » 5 » 1928	1938—1987 D P	1/5 1938	1/5—1/11	111 1/4	111	111 1/2	—	107
» » 5 » 1931	1941—1990 D P	1941	15/2—15/8	114	—	113	—	108
Svenska Bostadskreditkassan[3] . . . . 3 1/2 » 1934	1944—1974 D P	15/10 1944	15/4—15/10	—	102 1/2	—	—	—
» » 5 » 1930	1940—1970 D P	15/7 1940	15/1—15/7	108 1/2	108 1/2	109 1/2	—	—
» » 5 » 1932	1942—1972 D P	15/1 1942	15/1—15/7	112 1/2	112	—	—	108
Svenska Skeppshypotekskassan[4] (No. 1) 5 » 1930	Maturity *Rückzahlung* 1/3 1950	1/3 1940	1/3—1/9	108 3/4	108	108 1/4	—	—
» (No. 2) 5 » 1931	» » 1/12 1951	1/12 1941	1/6—1/12	108 1/2	108 1/2	108 1/2	—	—
Sthlms Int. Gar. A.-B. (The Mortgage Bank of Stockholm Ltd) 3 » 1934	1944—1993 D P	1/12 1944	1/6—1/12	95 1/4	96 1/2	95 1/2	92 1/4	—
» » 4 1/2 » 1928	1938—1987 D P	1/2 1938	1/2—1/8	105	105	105	104	104
» » 4 1/2 » 1931	1941—1990 D P	15/1 1941	15/1—15/7	107	—	108 1/2	107	106 1/2
Sv. Obligationskredit A.-B.[5] Ser. IV 6 1/2 » 1924	1925—1949 D P	15/10 »	15/4—15/10	95	—	85	81	—
» » » V 6 » 1930	1932—1957 D P	1/7 1935	9/1—1/7	95	—	—	—	—
» » » VI 6 » 1930	1931—1968 D P	1/12 1940	1/6—1/12	92	—	—	—	—
	Twice a year. *Zweimal jährlich.*							
City of Stockholm 3 1/2 » 1905	1906—1949 D P	1915	15/3—15/9	102 1/2	102	102	101	100
» » 3 1/2 » 1909	1910—1949 D P	1919	15/6—15/12	102 1/2	—	102	101	100 1/2
» » 4 » 1880	1881—1936 D		15/6—15/12	101	101	101	100 1/2	100 1/2
» » 4 » 1908	1909—1948 D P	1918	15/9—15/8	103	—	103	102 1/2	102

An der Börse eingeführt		
Schwedischer Staat	3 %	1888
»	3 »	1894
»	3 »	1934
»	3 1/2 »	1886
»	3 1/2 »	1900 à Kr. 1 816
»	» »	à Kr. 9 080 & 18 160
»	3 1/2 »	1904/06/07
»	3 1/2 »	1908
»	3 1/2 »	1911
»	3 1/2 »	1933
»	3 1/2 »	1934
»	4 »	1931
»	4 »	1933
»	4 »	1933
»	4 »	1933
»	4 1/2 »	1927
»	4 1/2 »	1929
»	4 1/2 »	1930
»	4 1/2 »	1932
Sveriges Allm. Hypoteksbank	3 1/2 %	1886
(*Schwed. Reichs-Hypothekenbank*)	3 1/2 »	1889
» »	3 3/4 »	1934
» »	4 »	1878
» »	4 »	1879
» »	4 »	1908
» »	4 »	1931
» »	4 »	1933
» »	4 1/2 »	1927
» »	4 1/2 »	1929
» »	4 1/2 »	1931
» »	5 »	1926
Kon. Sveriges Stadshypotekskassa	3 »	1934
(*Stadthypothekenkasse Schwedens*)	3 »	1935
	3 1/2 »	1910
» »	3 1/2 »	1933
	3 1/2 %	1935 Ser. I
» »	4 %	1931
» »	4 »	1934
» »	4 1/2 »	1927
» »	4 1/2 »	1930
» »	4 1/2 »	1932
» »	4 1/2 »	1933
» »	5 »	1928
» »	5 »	1931
Svenska Bostadskreditkassan[3]	3 1/2 »	1934
» »	5 »	1930
» »	5 »	1932
Svenska Skeppshypotekskassan[4] (No. 1)	5 »	1930
» (No. 2)	5 »	1931
Sthlms Int. Gar. A.-B. (*Stockholmer Hypotheken-Garantie A. G.*)	3 »	1934
» »	4 1/2 »	1928
» »	4 1/2 »	1931
Sv. Obligationskredit A.-B.[5] Ser. IV	6 1/2 »	1924
» » » V	6 »	1930
» » » VI	6 »	1930
Stadt Stockholm	3 1/2 »	1905
» »	3 1/2 »	1909
» »	4 »	1880
» »	4 »	1908

[1] After 15/5 1941. — *Vom 15/5 1941 an.*

[2] After 15/4 1944. — *Vom 15/4 1944 an.*

[3] The Residential Mortgage Bank of Sweden, founded in 1929, is the central organization of a number of local credit associations having for object to grant loans to their members against mortgages on homes. It has a guaranty fund of 30 mill. Kr. in 4 1/2 % Government bonds placed at its disposal by the Government. — *Schwedische Wohnungshypotheken-Bank, die im Jahre 1929 gegründet wurde, ist die Zentralstelle einer Anzahl lokaler Kreditkassen, die den Zweck haben, an ihre Mitglieder Anleihen gegen Haushypotheken zu bewilligen. Die Bank hat einen Garantiefonds von 30 Mill. Kr. in 4 1/2 % Schwed. Staatsobligationen.*

[4] The Swedish Ship Mortgage Bank, founded in 1929, has for object to grant loans against mortgages on Swedish ships. As a guaranty fund for the Bank the Government has placed at its disposal Swedish Government bonds for 10 mill. Kr. — *Die Bank für Schwedische Schiffshypotheken-Kasse, die im Jahre 1929 gegründet wurde, ist gegen Sicherheit von Hypotheken auf schwedische Schiffe tätig zu gewähren. Als Grundfonds für die Kasse stellt der Staat schwedische Staatsobligationen im Betrage von 10 Mill. Kr. zur Verfügung.*

[5] The Swedish Obligationskredit A.-B. is a joint stock company established by four leading Swedish banks for the purpose of negotiating credits preferably with foreign countries. Its share capital amounts to Kr. 12 000 000. The series II is secured by 6 % Finnish Govt. bonds of 1923, the series III by 7 1/2 % Hungarian Govt. bonds of 1924, the series IV by 7 % German Govt. bonds of 1924, the series V by 7 % Austrian Govt. bonds of 1930, and the series VI by 6 % Greek Govt. bonds of 1931. — *Die Svenska Obligationskredit A.-B. ist eine von vier führenden Schwedischen Banken gegründete Aktiengesellschaft, welche die Vermittlung von Krediten vorzugsweise mit dem Ausland bezweckt. Das Aktienkapital beträgt Kr. 12 000 000. Die Sicherheit für Serie II besteht aus 6 % Obl. des Finnländischen Staates von 1923, für Serie III aus 7 1/2 % Obl. des Ungarischen Staates von 1924, für Serie IV aus 7 % Obl. des Deutschen Reichs von 1924, für Serie V aus 7 % Obl. des Österreichischen Staates von 1930 und für Serie VI aus 6 % Obl. des Griechischen Staates von 1931.*

* Amortization-dates underlined. — *Tilgungstermine unterstrichen.*

Terms of Redemption *Tilgungsmodalitäten*: D = Drawings *Auslosung*; P = Purchase *Rückkauf*; R = Perpetual Loan *Staatsrente*

Quoted on the Stock Exchange	Terms of Redemption	Redeemable in Whole *Konvertibel*	Interest Dates *Zinstermine* *	Prices (bid) *Notierungen (Geld)* 1935 29/3	30/4	31/5	28/6	2/7	*An der Börse eingeführt*
City of Stockholm 4½ % 1913	1914—1952 D P	1923	15/6—15/12	103	—	103½	103	103	*Stadt Stockholm* 4½ % 1913
» » 4½ » 1931	1932—1971 D P	15/5 1941	15/5—15/11	106	106½	107	104	104	» » 4½ » 1931
» » Conv. 5 » 1918	1919—1958 D P	15/10 1938	15/4—15/10	105	—	105	104¼	104	» » *Konv.* 5 » 1918
» » » 5 » 1918	1919—1958 D P	15/3 1939	15/3—15/9	105	105¼	—	104½	104	» » » 5 » 1918
» » 5 » 1932	1933—1962 D P	15/3 1942	15/3—15/9	109	109	109	107½	106½	» » 5 » 1932
City of Gothenburg 4 » 1906	1907—1946 D P	1916	15/4—15/10	101	—	101	101	100½	*Stadt Gotenburg* 4 » 1906
» » 4 » 1922 conv.	1923—1956 D P	31/12 1943	30/6—31/12	104¾	—	105	103½	103½	» » 4 » 1922 *konv.*
City of Malmö 4 » 1905	1906—1945 D	1915	1/4— 1/10	101	101	101	100¾	100¾	*Stadt Malmö* 4 » 1905
Bergslagernas Järnvägs A.-B. (Railway) 4 » 1898 conv.	1912—1961 D at 110 % *su 110 %*		15/1—15/7	105	106½	107	105	105	Bergslagernas Järnvägs A.-B. (*Eisenbahn*) 4 » 1898 *konv.*
Trafik A.-B. Grängesberg—Oxelösund (Iron Ore) 4½ » 1930	1935—1960 D	15/11 1940	15/5—15/11	104	104	104¼	104	103¾	Trafik A.-B. Grängesberg—Oxelösund (*Eisenerz*) 4½ » 1930
» » 5½ » 1932	1937—1952 D	1/5 1942	1/5— 1/11	107½	108½	109	106½	106	» » 5½ » 1932
Luossavaara—Kiirunavaara A.-B. (Iron Ore) 4½ » 1930 [1]	1931—1955 D	15/4 1940	15/4—15/10	104	105¼	104	103	103	Luossavaara—Kiirunavaara A.-B. (*Eisenerz*) 4½ » 1930 [1]
» » » 5 » 1928 [1]	1938—1953 D	1/12 1938	1/6— 1/12	104½	105½	105	105	104	» » » 5 » 1928 [1]
Holmens Bruks & Fabr. A.-B. (Paper, Pulp and Cottongoods) 5 » 1926	1932—1951 D	1/10 1936	1/4— 1/10	—	—	—	101	101	Holmens Bruks & Fabr. A.-B. (*Papier, Holzmasse u. Baumwollwaren*) 5 » 1926
Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson (Telephones) 6 » 1927	1928—1947 D	15/10 1937	15/4—15/10	105¼	105½	105	104	104	Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson (*Fernsprecher*) 6 » 1927
Uddeholms A.-B. (Wood and Iron products) 4½ » 1930	1940—1970 D	1/12 1940	1/6—1/12	107	107	107¼	106½	106½	Uddeholms A.-B. (*Eisen- u. Holzwaren*) 4½ » 1930
» » 5 » 1921 conv.	1931—1953 D	15/3 1939	15/3—15/9	106¼	106¾	106	105	104	» » 5 » 1921 *konv.*

Not quoted on the Stock Exchange — Approximate Prices (bid) *Approx. Kurse (Geld)*

									An der Börse nicht eingeführt
Allmänna Svenska Elektriska A.-B. (ASEA) (Electrical Machinery) 5 % 1929	1930—1954 D	1/3 1939	1/3— 1/9	105½	106	106	105	105	Allmänna Svenska Elektriska A.-B. (ASEA) (*Elektrische Maschinen*) 5 % 1929
Kramfors A.-B. (Pulp and Timber) 5 » 1928	1933—1952 D	15/6 1938	15/6—15/12	105	104½	104½	104	104	Kramfors A.-B. (*Holzmasse und Holz*) 5 » 1928
Marma-Långrörs A.-B. (Pulp and Timber) 4 » 1935	1940—1955 D	1/10 1945	1/4—1/10	102	102¼	102¼	102	102	Marma-Långrörs A.-B. (Holzmasse und Holz) 4 » 1935
Rederi A.-B. Svenska Lloyd (Shipping) 6½ % 1920 conv.	1928—1942 D		15/3—15/9	105	104	104½	104½	104½	Rederi A.-B. Svenska Lloyd (*Reederei*) 6½ % 1920 *konv.*
Svenska Tändsticks A.-B. (Matches) 5 » 1931	1936—1956 D	2/1 1941	2/1— 1/7	93	93½	95½	96	96	Svenska Tändsticks A.-B. (*Zündhölzer*) 5 % 1931
Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson (Telephones), Registered certificates 5½ » 1931	1941—1951 D	15/6 1936 [3]	15/6—15/12	101¼	102¼	—	104¼	104	Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson (*Fernsprecher*), *Schuldverschreibungen* 5½ » 1931
Skandinaviska Kredit A.-B., Registered certificates 5½ » 1925	Maturity *Rückzahlung* 15/6 1940	15/6 1935 [2]	15/6—15/12	105½	105¾	102½	104	104½	Skandinaviska Kredit A.-B., *Schuldverschreibungen* 5½ » 1925

[1] Guaranteed by the Trafik A.-B. Grängesberg—Oxelösund. — *Mit Bürgschaft der Trafik A.-B. Grängesberg—Oxelösund.* — [2] Redeemable in whole or in part on or after June 15th, 1935, at 103 %. — *Die Bank behält sich das Recht vor, die Schuldverschreibungen vom 15. Juni 1935 an, ganz oder teilweise, zum Kurse von 103 % einzulösen.* — [3] The company has the right to redeem the loan in 1936 at 105 %, in 1937 at 104 %, in 1938 at 103 %, in 1939 at 102 %, in 1940 at 101 %, in 1941 and thereafter at 100 %. — *Die Gesellschaft ist berechtigt, die Anleihe im Jahre 1936 zu 105 %, 1937 zu 104 %, 1938 zu 103 %, 1939 zu 102 %, 1940 zu 101 % und in folgenden Jahren zu 100 % einzulösen.*

* **Amortization-dates underlined.** — *Tilgungstermine unterstrichen.*

Quotations of Foreign Bonds. — *Kursnotierungen für ausländische Obligationen.*

In percentage; ex interest. — *In %, exclusive Zinsen.*

Terms of Redemption *Tilgungsmodalitäten*: D = Drawings *Auslosung*; P = Purchase *Rückkauf*; R = Perpetual Loan *Staatsrente*

Quoted on the Stock Exchange	Terms of Redemption	Redeemable in Whole *Konvertibel*	Interest Dates *Zinstermine* *	Prices (bid) *Notierungen (Geld)* 1935 29/3	30/4	31/5	28/6	2/7	*An der Börse eingeführt*
Belgium, Kingdom of 7 % 1926	1928—1956 D [1] P	1/11 1936 [1]	1/5— 1/11	108	107	106¾	107	—	*Belgischer Staat* 7 % 1926
» » » 4½ » 1930 [2]	1936—1985 D	1/11 1936	1/5— 1/11	—	—	—	—	—	» » 4½ » 1930 [2]
Danish Government 5 » 1928 [4]	1933—1958 D P	15/3 1938	15/3—15/9	—	122½	114	107	110	*Dänischer Staat* 5 » 1928 [4]
Danish Mortgage Bank 4½ » 1931 [5]	1936—1971 D P	15/3 1941	15/3—15/9	—	101½	102	102¾	102¾	*Dän. Hypothekenbank* 4½ » 1931 [5]
» » » 5 » 1927 [4]	1933—1967 D P	15/5 1937	15/5—15/11	113	110	—	—	108	» » 5 » 1927 [4]
Copenhagen, City of 4½ » 1930 [6]	1931—1970 D P	1/12 1941	1/6— 1/12	—	101½	102	100½	101	*Stadt Kopenhagen* 4½ » 1930 [6]
Finnish Government 4½ » 1934	1935—1944 D P	—	1/4— 1/10	—	101½	101½	101½	101½	*Finl. Staat* 4½ » 1934
Finnish Mortgage Association 6½ » 1929	1930—1959 D	1/6 1939	1/6— 1/12	105¼	105½	105½	105½	105½	*Finl. Hypothekenvereinigung* 6½ » 1929 [3]
Municipal Bank of Norway, Ser. I 5½ » 1929 [3]	1932—1969 D P	1/9 1939	1/3— 1/9	104	105	105½	105	105	*Norw. Kommunalbank* Ser I 5½ » 1929 [3]
Municipal Bank of Norway, Ser. II 5½ » 1929 [3]	1932—1969 D P	1/10 1939	1/4— 1/10	104	105	105½	105	105	» » » II 5½ » 1929 [3]
Municipal Bank of Norway [illegible] » 1930 [3]	1935—1970 D P	1/4 1940	1/6— 1/12	102	103	103	103	103	Norw. Kommunalbank [illegible] 5 » 1930 [3]
» » » » 4 » 1934	1935—1954 D P	[illegible] 1939	[illegible]				100	100	» » 4 » 1934 [3]
German Govt. (Young-Loan) 5½ » 1930	1931—1965 D P	1/6 1935	1/6— 1/12	7 39¼	7 34¾	7 29	36¼ [7] [8]	34 [7] [8]	*Deutscher Staat* (*Young-Anleihe*) 5½ » 1930

[1] At 105 per cent. — *Zu 105 Prozent.* — [2] The bonds are issued also for Dutch guilders and Swiss francs. — *Die Obligationen lauten auch auf Holländische Gulden und Schweizerfrancs.* — [3] Guaranteed by the Government. — *Mit Bürgschaft des Staates.* — [4] Issued also for £, H.Fl. and D. Kr. — *Lauten auch auf* £, *Hfl.* [illegible] — [5] [illegible] — [6] [illegible] — [7] [illegible] — [8] [illegible] in the open market. Since 1st of June, 1935, not officially quoted. — *Inoffizielle Notierung, seit dem 1. Juni 1935 nicht auf Börse notiert.*

* **Amortization-dates underlined.** — *Tilgungstermine unterstrichen.*

Quotations of Swedish Shares. — *Kursnotierungen für schwedische Aktien.*

Quoted on the Stock Exchange	Share Capital *Aktien-kapital*	Nom. Value *Nenn-wert*	Dividends *Dividende* [1] 1933	1934	1935	Prices (bid) *Notierungen (Geld)* 1935 30/3	30/4	31/5	28/6	2/7	*An der Börse eingeführt*
Industrial and Miscellaneous Shares.	Mill. Kr.	Kr.	Kronor			Kronor					***Industrie- und diverse Aktien.***
A.-B. Bofors (War Materials)	19.8	100	4	7	9	157	156	158	153	153	A.-B. Bofors (*Kriegsmaterial*)
» Elektrolux (Vacuum Cleaners) Series A	6	100	8	8	9	[4]152	—	[2]148	150	154	» Elektrolux (*Staubsauger*) *Ser. A*
» Elektrolux (Vacuum Cleaners) » B	54	100	8	8	9	145	[2]152	[2,4]148	153	153	» Elektrolux (*Staubsauger*) » *B*
» Investor (Holding Company)	36	500	20	20	20	495	490	512	529	531	» Investor (*Holdinggesellschaft*)
» Nordiska Kompaniet (Department Store) Pref.	6	50	3	3		54	55	57	55	53.50	» Nordiska Kompaniet *Vorzugs-Aktien*
» Nordiska Kompaniet (Department Store) Ord.	19	50	1.50	—	1.50	26.50	[2] 27	27.50	29	30	» Nordiska Kompaniet (*Warenhaus*) *Stamm-Aktien*
» Separator (Milk Separators) Ord. A	42	100	—	—	3	55	63	65.50	81	80	» Separator (*Separatoren*) *Stamm-Aktien A*
» Separator (Milk Separators) » B	39.7	100	—	—	3	55.50	63	66.50	80.50	80	» Separator (*Separatoren*) » *B*
» Stockholms Bryggerier (Brewery)	29.6	100	15	15		273	277	285	297	298	» Stockholms Bryggerier (*Brauerei*)
» Svenska Kullagerfabriken (SKF) (Ball Bearings) Series A	76	100	7	8	58	201	210	200	203	204	» Svenska Kullagerfabriken (SKF) (*Kugellager*) *Ser. A*
» Svenska Kullagerfabriken (SKF) (Ball Bearings) » B	54	100	7	8	58	202	213	204	208	206	» Svenska Kullagerfabriken (SKF) (*Kugellager*) » *B*
» Svenska Metallverken (Metal Products)	12.1	60	—	2.40	4.20	66.50	69	[2]71	77	75.50	» Svenska Metallverken (*Metallwaren*)
» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (Lithographical Printers) Pref.	12	100	7	7		[4]139	127	135	132	135	» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier *Vorzugs-Aktien*
» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (Lithographical Printers) Ord. A	16	100	4	4		95	101	103	105	105	» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier *Stamm-Aktien A*
» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (Lithographical Printers) » A 1930	11	100	4	4		92	100	103	104	104	» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (*Lithographische Druckereien*) » *A 1930*
» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (Lithographical Printers) » B	4.4	100	—	—		55	63	60	64	65.50	» Sveriges Litografiska Tryckerier (*Lithographische Druckereien*) » *B*
Allmänna Svenska Elektriska A.-B. (ASEA) (Electrical Machinery)	75	100	7	6	7	[2]122	124	128	134	134	Allmänna Svenska Elektriska A.-B. (ASEA) (*Elektrische Maschinen*)
Bergvik & Ala Nya A.-B. (Pulp and Timber)	28.13	180	8	10	12	210	213	[2,4]215	215	215	Bergvik & Ala Nya A.-B. (*Holzmasse und Holz*)
Billeruds A.-B. (Paper, Pulp and Timber)	28.2	100	3	5	6	103	[2]104	99.50	107	107	Billeruds A.-B. (*Papier, Holzmasse und Holz*)
Ford Motor Company A.-B.	5	100	—	—	7	[2] 91	112	116	119	123	Ford Motor Company A.-B.
Holmens Bruks- & Fabriks A.-B. (Pulp, Paper and Cotton Goods) Series A	21	100	5	5	5	85	83.50	84	85	85	Holmens Bruks- & Fabriks A.-B. (*Papier, Holzmasse u. Baumwollwaren*) *Ser. A*
Holmens Bruks- & Fabriks A.-B. (Pulp, Paper and Cotton Goods) » B	13.56	100	5	5	5	85	83.50	84	[4]85	85	Holmens Bruks- & Fabriks A.-B. (*Papier, Holzmasse u. Baumwollwaren*) » *B*
Höganäs-Billesholms A.-B. (Coal, Firebrick and Clay Goods)	30	100	3.50	4.50	5	101	107	[2]104	104	105	Höganäs-Billesholms A.-B. (*Kohlen, Feuerfester Ziegel und Tonwaren*)
Kopparbergs o. Hofors' Sågverks A.-B. (Pulp and Timber)	20	100	—	—	5	89	[2]90	89	90	90.50	Kopparbergs & Hofors' Sågverks A.-B. (*Holzmasse und Holz*)
Korsnäs' Sågverks A.-B. (Paper, Pulp and Timber)	21	500	20	25	25	570	590	[4]610	585	600	Korsnäs' Sågverks A.-B. (*Papier, Holzmasse u. Holz*)
Linoleum A.-B. Forshaga (Linoleum)	4	50	—	4.80		98	[4]105	103	105	102	Linoleum A.-B. Forshaga (*Linoleum*)
Mexikanska Telefon A.-B. Ericsson (Telephone Service) Series A	5.4	180	—	—	—	—	84	87	[4]95	[4]93	Mexikanska Telefon A.-B. Ericsson *Ser. A*
Mexikanska Telefon A.-B. Ericsson (Telephone Service) » B	16.2	180	—	—	—	[4] 81	83	85	82	83.50	Mexikanska Telefon A.-B. Ericsson (*Fernsprecherdienst*) » *B*
Sandvikens Jernverks A.-B. (Iron)	16	100	[3]+3	[3]+3	[3]+5	164	[2]159	165	176	183	Sandvikens Jernverks A.-B. (*Eisen*)
Skånska Cement A.-B. (Cement)	10.4	1 000	120	100	100	[4]2050	2060	2000	2100	2155	Skånska Cement A.-B. (*Zement*)
Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags A.-B. (Paper, Pulp, Timber and Iron)	60	100	5	6	7	183	[2]183	189	189	188	Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags A.-B. (*Eisen, Papier, Holzmasse und Holz*)
Svenska A.-B. Gasaccumulator (AGA) (Beacon Lighting etc.) Pref. shares	28.6	100	2	2	3	54	[2] 55	60	71	71.50	Svenska A.-B. Gasaccumulator (AGA) (*AGA-Licht etc.*) *Vorzugs-Aktien*
Svenska Sockerfabriks A.-B. (Sugar)	81	60	3.50	3.50		65.50	66	68	72	71.50	Svenska Sockerfabriks A.-B. (*Zucker*)
Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson (Telephones) Series A	40.33	50	—	—		18	18	19	20.50	20.50	Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson *Ser. A*
Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson (Telephones) » B	60.50	50	—	—		18	18	19	20.50	21	Telefon A.-B. L. M. Ericsson (*Fernsprecher*) » *B*
Trafik A.-B. Grängesberg—Oxelösund (Iron Ore)	119	100	—	—		59	62	65.50	67	65.50	Trafik A.-B. Grängesberg—Oxelösund (*Eisenerz*)
Uddeholms A.-B. (Pulp, Timber and Iron)	56	100	2	3	4	88	92.50	[2]92	98.50	101	Uddeholms A.-B. (*Eisen, Holzmasse und Holz*)
Wifstavarfs A.-B. (Pulp and Timber)	14.5	100	4	6	7	139	[2]140	135	146	145	Wifstavarfs A.-B. (*Holzmasse und Holz*)
Railway and Shipping Shares.											***Eisenbahn- und Reederei-Aktien.***
A.-B. Svenska Amerika Linien (Shipping)	24	100	3	—		28	24.50	26	34	37	A.-B. Svenska Amerika Linien (*Reederei*)
Bergslagernas Järnvägs A.-B. (Railway)	25.15	200	—	—	6	[4]125	130	[2]130	144	149	Bergslagernas Järnvägs A.-B. (*Eisenbahn*)
Stockholms Rederi A.-B. Svea (Shipping)	17.64	30	—	—	1.50	26	[2] 26	27.50	30.50	30.50	Stockholms Rederi A.-B. Svea (*Reederei*)
Bank Shares.											***Bank-Aktien.***
A.-B. Göteborgs Bank	*43.75	125	—	—	—	105	111	113	115	115	A.-B. Göteborgs Bank
» Svenska Handelsbanken	*137	100	6	6	7	[2]142	141	143	151	154	» Svenska Handelsbanken
Skandinaviska Kredit A.-B.	*132	142	—	8	8	[2]173	180	182	192	191	Skandinaviska Kredit A.-B.
Stockholms Enskilda Bank A.-B.	*100	1 000	[3]50 + 100	[3]50 + 100	[3]50 + 100	[2]3810	3775	3875	3800	3850	Stockholms Enskilda Bank A.-B.
Stockholms Intecknings Garanti A.-B.	* 35	300	40	40	40	[4]940	[2]870	911	900	[4]930	Stockholms Intecknings Garanti A.-B.

[1] Refer to dividends paid for the preceding financial year. — *Bezieht sich auf Dividenden, die für das vorgehende Geschäftsjahr bezahlt worden sind.* — * Ex dividend. — *Abzügl. Dividende.* — [3] Interim dividend. — *Vorschusszahlung.* — [4] Selling rate. — *Briefkurs.* — [5] Plus 1/5 share in the A.-B. Volvo of nom. Kr. 50: —. — *Zuzüglich 1/5 Aktie in der A.-B. Volvo von nom. Kr. 50: —.*

* **Paid-up capital and reserves.** — ***Grundkapital und Reserven.***

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SKANDINAVISKA KREDITAKTIEBOLAGET

STATEMENT OF CONDITION MAY, 31st, 1935

Assets

Cash in hand		Kr. 65.043.671: 73
Bills:		
Swedish	Kr. 266.598.252: 58	
Foreign	» 23.107.623: 10	» 289.705.875: 68
Loans (secured)		» 392.549.063: 98
Current Accounts (secured)		» 74.299.620: 70
Swedish Banks		» 4.139.615: 55
Foreign Banks		» 18.756.591: 06
Sundry Accounts		» 31.375.344: 33
Bonds		» 67.503.528: 31
Shares		» 186.858.885: 54
Bank Buildings & Furniture		» 15.713.161: 50
		Kr. 1.145.945.358: 38

Liabilities

Bills at sight in circulation (»postremiss» bills)		Kr. 13.402.381: 66
Deposits:		
at sight	Kr. 146.376.854: 18	
at notice	» 506.919.648: 80	» 653.296.502: 98
Swedish Banks		» 33.069.617: 54
Foreign Banks		» 21.838.462: 26
Sundry Accounts		» 92.338.393: 94
5½ % Registered Certificates of the Bank (»Förlagsbevis»)		» 200.000.000: —
Share Capital	Kr. 87.188.000: —	
Reserve Fund	» 44.812.000: —	» 132.000.000: —
		Kr. 1.145.945.358: 38

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Australia
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Malmö